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Lending Innovations
Xuan-Thao Nguyen†
INTRODUCTION
Each day new startups with new ideas are born. Without
access to financing, brilliant founders simply cannot bring their
most promising enterprises into existence. Upstart entrepreneurs,
possessing dreams of innovation, know all too well that banks shun
them as clients.1 Their startups have no positive cash flow.2 Some
are months, if not years, from generating revenue.3 Some are still
trying to establish their niche; they are trying to “grow and scale.”4
Their growth model does not yield any profit and will most likely

† Professor Xuan-Thao Nguyen is the Gerald L. Bepko Chair in Law &
Director, Center for Intellectual Property & Innovation, Indiana University Robert H.
McKinney School of Law. Special thanks to Erik Hille, for the joy of working on the IP
Venture Banking project. This article is part of a series of papers from the project.
1 As tech companies cannot obtain capital from banks, venture capital becomes
the only source of funding. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n in Support
of Respondent, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) (No.
10-1150), 2011 WL 5544808, at *7–8 (stating that companies in high-risk disruptive
innovations “do not have access to traditional avenues of funding” and that they “simply
would not exist without venture capital, often the only source of funding”); Ilya A. Strebulaev
& Will Gornall, How Much Does Venture Capital Drive the U.S. Economy?, STAN. BUS. (Oct.
21, 2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/how-much-does-venture-capital-drive-useconomy [https://perma.cc/588C-QA4W] (“Venture capital (VC) is a high-touch form of
financing that is used primarily by young, innovative, and highly risky companies.”).
2 See J.T. Ripton, How to Fix Your Startup Cash Flow Problems, TECHSTARS
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.techstars.com/content/startup-weekend/fix-startup-cash-fl
ow-problems [https://perma.cc/5PXN-23DX] (reporting that many startups fail because
of cash flow problems).
3 See Joseph Flaherty, Invisible Unicorns: 35 Big Companies that Started with
Little or No Money, TECHCRUNCH (July 1, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/201
7/07/01/invisible-unicorns-35-big-companies-that-started-with-little-or-no-money/
[https://perma.cc/3EZ2-NT8E] (detailing startups with sweat equity to perfect their
products and nimbly generate revenue); Miguel Socias, The Increasing Pressures for
Startup Revenue, CARTA (June 12, 2017), https://carta.com/blog/the-increasing-pressurefor-startup-revenue-2/ [https://perma.cc/NEK7-3PWE] (graphing startups with and
without revenue at the different funding rounds).
4 See, e.g., Adi Gaskell, What Startups Need To Scale Up, FORBES (May 30, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/adigaskell/2018/05/30/what-startups-need-to-scale-up/#655
3f4f67a3c [https://perma.cc/NF8Z-ENF4]; Ron Carucci, How the Best Entrepreneurs Scale
Their Startups for Growth, FORBES (June 11, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/roncar
ucci/2018/06/11/how-the-best-entrepreneurs-scale-their-startups-for-growth/#66c4e5223570
[https://perma.cc/B7A4-37NF].
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not be generating profit any time soon.5 Their most valuable assets
are soft assets, ranging from trade secrets, patent applications,
patents, and copyrights to apps, software, and data analytics.6
Their trademark is unknown in the marketplace, as it has attached
only to new products that the enterprise has struggled to roll out
beyond the beta testing phase.7
Consequently, banks reject startup technology as collateral
for a business loan because there is too much uncertainty.8 To
banks, startups are too risky and most likely cannot pay back the
loans.9 In the end, banks sit on the sideline of innovations.
As banks sit on the sideline with their traditional lending
business model,10 banks themselves are disappearing rapidly in the
modern economy. Once upon a time, there were more than ten
thousand banks in the United States.11 Bank failures and
5 See Xin En Lee, No Profit? No Problem. Investors Keep Snapping Up LossMaking Companies, CNBC (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/29/no-profitsno-problem-the-economy-has-a-growing-appetite-for-unprofitable-companies.html
[https://perma.cc/FX6S-8LRA] (noting that “76 percent of the companies that listed were
unprofitable in the year before their initial public offerings”).
6 See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 102 (2012) (noting startups don’t have traditional assets to serve as
collateral for bank loans); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255,
1287–1309 (2009) (analyzing how patents enable startups to be competitive); Keith Strahan
& Josh Mathews, Legal Proficiencies and Skills for the Tech Lawyer, 57 HOUS. LAW. 10, 11
(2019) (“For many startups, their most important asset is their intellectual property.”); David
S. Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
751, 758–60 (2019) (explaining how trade secrets are more appropriate for startups with datacentric, software, and business methods).
7 Beta testing is an important process prior to startups rolling out their products
to the public, and there are many concerns startups must address to prevent disastrous
consequences. See Rip Empson, Does Your Startup Need Beta Testers? BetaBait Will Hook
You Up (Now on Email & The Web), TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 5, 2012), https://techcrunch.
com/2012/01/05/does-your-startup-need-beta-testers-betabait-will-hook-you-up-now-onemail-the-web/ [https://perma.cc/U2W5-7QCW]. In fact, startups will seek to have private
alpha testing and gain critical feedback for improvements before they can advance to the
beta testing. See Will Little, The Art and Science of Private Alpha Testing, STARTUP ROCKET
(Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.startuprocket.com/articles/the-art-and-science-of-private-alp
ha-testing [https://perma.cc/L3HF-XV77].
8 See Jean Murray, Why Do Banks Say No to Business Startup Loans?, BALANCE
SMALL BUS. (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/why-do-banks-say-no-tobusiness-startup-loans-398025 [https://perma.cc/88JC-7PSH]; Why Banks Don’t Lend to
Startups, GLOBAL CAP. PARTNERS (Oct. 4, 2018), https://gcpfund.com/news/banks-dontlend-to-startups/ [https://perma.cc/NE5X-V5Q7].
9 See Sarah E. Needleman, When Banks Won’t Lend to Your Startup, WALL
STREET J. (Mar. 8, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-banks-wont-lend-to-your-sta
rtup-1394328392 [https://perma.cc/YK5S-3389].
10 Julia
Kagan, Commercial Bank, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commercialbank.asp [https://perma.cc/3T2K-SBCM].
11 See ROISIN MCCORD ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, EXPLAINING THE
DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF BANKS SINCE THE GREAT RECESSION 1 (Mar. 2015), https://
www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_brief/2015/pdf/
eb_15-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZS5-4C7V] (providing the historical figures that between 1960
to 1980, “there were between 12,000 and 13,000 independent banks in the United States”).
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consolidation drastically reduced that number to less than six
thousand.12 Technological advancements, online banking, online
payments, and the rise of non-bank lenders challenge banks’
existence.13 Yet banks adhere to the old business model pursuant
to banking laws and regulations, refusing to lend to young
enterprises in innovation-intensive sectors.14 There exist, however,
outlier banks that disrupt the old business model and establish
themselves in tech lending areas, which most banks avoid.15
The outlier banks lend to young enterprises in tech sectors
where 99.9 percent of banks are too afraid to participate.16 The
outlier banks are commercial banks operating under the same
banking laws and regulations imposed on all banks but who dare
to make loans to startups and high-growth enterprises that either
are pre-revenue or have zero profits.17 The outlier banks
understand that these enterprises are hungry for bank loans to
feed their growth appetites.18 The outlier banks know that
potential clients are located in all innovation centers across the
12 See Robert Klingler & Jonathan Hightower, Landscape of the U.S.
Banking Industry, BANK BCLP (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.bankbryancave.com/2017
/04/landscape-of-the-u-s-banking-industry/ [https://perma.cc/9BMU-BQP2] (stating
that as of December 31, 2016, there were 5,922 banks in the United States, covering
“[t]he four largest depository institutions by asset size[,] . . . . 111 additional banks
that ha[d] assets greater than $10 billion, . . . . 627” banks with assets “between $1
and $10 billion,” and the remainder “87.5% of banks . . . with less than $1 billion in
assets”). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) updates the data on
bank failures. See Bank Failures in Brief – Summary 2001 through 2020, FDIC (Apr.
3, 2020), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/ [https://perma.cc/SV9D-35RK];
Failed Bank List, FDIC (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/b
ank list.html [https://perma.cc/VAK6-HHAB].
13 See John Maxfield, Why Are Bank Branches Disappearing?, MOTLEY FOOL (Nov.
1, 2017), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/11/01/why-are-bank-branches-disappearing.a
spx [https://perma.cc/P9P3-B2SS]; see also Chanyaporn Chanjaroen, Pandit Says 30% of
Bank Jobs May Disappear in Next Five Years, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-13/ex-citi-ceo-pandit-says-30-of-bankjobs-at-risk-from-technology [https://perma.cc/7PB6-YCRS]. Banks have been cutting jobs to
cope with the digital and Artificial Intelligence era. See Silla Brush & Kati Pohjanpalo,
Disappearing Banks Jobs Won’t Be Coming Back, Nordea CEO Says, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29,
2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-29/disappearing-bank-jobs-won-tbe-coming-back-nordea-ceo-says [https://perma.cc/D7CT-AZXZ].
14 In our series of four law review articles on Technology Lending for
Innovation, we first documented, through empirical evidence, that banks refuse to lend
to tech startups. See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Erik Hille, Patent Aversion: An
Empirical Study of Patents Collateral in Bank Lending, 1980-2016, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
141, 168–71 (2018) [hereinafter Patent Aversion] (explaining why banks refuse to make
loans without hard assets as collateral under bank regulations against unsafe or
unsound banking practices).
15 In our companion article, we apply economics models to demonstrate how
outlier banks select startups to lend and reap handsome returns. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen
& Erik Hille, Disruptive Lending for Innovation: Signaling Model and Banks Selection
of Startups, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 200, 230 (2018) [hereinafter Signaling Model].
16 See infra Part II; Patent Aversion, supra note 14.
17 See infra Part II.
18 See infra Part II.

138

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

United States and around the world, from the Research Triangle
in North Carolina to the Pacific Northwest, from Silicon Valley to
the Southwest, from Boston to Shanghai, and from Shanghai to
London, Israel, and Ireland.19 The thicket of banking laws and
regulations cannot stop the outlier banks, which have crafted a
model to lend to the enterprises in the innovation sectors and
have garnered handsome returns for the banks.20 We refer to this
disruptive model as IP Venture Banking.
In IP Venture Banking, the outlier banks lend to startups
that have just received capital funding, typically in early Series
A and B rounds, from venture capital firms (VC), where the
startups will be likely to receive the next round of VC funding to
pay back the banks’ loans. These startups are often referred to
as venture-backed companies.21 The loans allow the venturebacked companies to extend their cash runway a few more
months, enabling them to meet their milestones and reach the
next round of VC funding. The venture-backed companies desire
the loans from banks because it is cheaper than borrowing from
alternative lenders.22 Moreover, acquiring debt is cheaper than
giving up equity, which is too costly for venture-backed
companies, but which would be required in order for them to
obtain a bridge round of funding from an investment fund.23
With cheap bank loans, venture-backed companies can propel
themselves to the next VC funding round and pay back the
venture loans to the outlier banks.
There are many innovative features embraced by outlier
banks. These banks dare to lend to startups in IP Venture
Banking because the banks know how to leverage their unique
relationship with VCs and founders. In addition, the banks
embrace startups’ intellectual property as a key driver of a
startup’s enterprise value. Specifically, an outlier bank captures
the client’s enterprise value by demanding warrants that give
the outlier bank the right to purchase the startup’s stock at a
nominal amount. The outlier bank will then cash in on the
warrants when the startup’s enterprise value rises dramatically
See infra Part III.
See infra Parts IV–VI.
21 Brian Feinstein & Craig Netterfield, Ten Questions Every Founder Should
Ask Before Raising Venture Debt, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 7, 2015), https://techcrunch.co
m/2015/08/07/ten-questions-every-founder-should-ask-before-raising-venture-debt/
[https://perma.cc/6NH2-4T8Q].
22 Alternative lenders are the non-banks that provide venture debt to startups that
have received rounds of VC funding. See Patrick Gordan, Venture Debt: A Capital Idea for
Startups, KAUFFMAN FELLOWS (Oct. 25, 2012), https://www.kauffmanfellows.org/journal_pos
ts/vent ure-debt-a-capital-idea-for-startups [https://perma.cc/64G8-XEP9] (tracing the history
of venture debt).
23 Id. (explaining the benefits of venture debt to both entrepreneurs and investors).
19
20
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at a later valuation, such as a subsequent round of VC funding,
acquisition by a third party, or IPO event. By demanding
warrants as part of the loan pricing, the outlier banks capture
the benefits of the intellectual property as part of the firms’
enterprise value as the firms grow and meet expectations for a
later and higher valuation event.24 The outlier banks also plan
for the downside, when startups are in liquidation, by taking
security interests in the intellectual property assets and
knowing how to locate purchasers of those intangible assets
when the startups are in financial distress.25
IP Venture Banking is a direct challenge to the traditional
banking business model. While outlier banks engaged in IP
Venture Banking are organized as traditional banks, their
business model goes against the norms. For example, it does not
require valuation of the intellectual property assets in making
business loans to the young enterprises. It accepts security
interests in the intellectual property assets only as a last resort.
It rides on the coattails of VC firms and selects clients who can
obtain future venture capital funding rounds to pay back the
loans and the warrants. It is IP Venture Debt as capital.26
This article is the first to identify the disruption in tech
lending by outlier commercial banks and to theorize the ways in
which IP Venture Banking is fueling innovation both nationwide and
globally. This disruptive model is a new beginning for both banks
and startups on the path of borrowing and lending for innovation.
Part I identifies the four outlier banks—from among the
six thousand total banks—that dare to venture into the
innovation-intensive sectors for lending purposes and dominate
the business model of lending for innovation. Based on extensive
efforts to extract data from bank lending activities, Part I reveals
the results and sorts through the empirical data.
Part II illuminates the complex geographical map of
innovation served by IP Venture Banking in the United States by
examining the industries that the outlier banks serve and the loci
where the outlier banks operate. Part II details both the activities
and influence outlier banks have spread to serve innovation
centers worldwide.
Part III explores key characteristics of outlier banks in
IP Venture Banking and the unique relationships that outlier
banks have with their VC clients.

24
25
26

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Parts V and VI.
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Part IV explains how warrants work, illustrating with
concrete sample loan and warrant agreements that outlier
banks have filed with the Securities Exchange Commission. Part
IV also analyzes the costs and benefits with regard to warrants
from the divergent perspectives of the startup borrowers and the
outlier banks.
In anticipation of the downside of IP Venture Banking,
Part V focuses on how outlier banks turn to secured transactions
law for protection, accepting collateral in the form of intellectual
property assets, such as patents, as a last resort in the event the
startup heads for liquidation.
Contrary to what experts have professed about the
importance of valuation of intellectual property in lending, Part VI
asserts that IP Venture Banking renders valuation of intellectual
property irrelevant. Due to both uncertainty and costs, outlier
banks do not require valuation of intellectual property assets when
determining whether to lend to a startup. Further, the outlier
banks’ reliance on the VCs for their intensive due diligence of the
startup reduces both risks and costs.
The article concludes that banks have a crucial role in
facilitating innovation by disrupting their own business model
and embracing IP Venture Banking. Otherwise, banks will soon
become relics of the past as they continue to adhere to old
business models.
I.

IDENTIFYING THE OUTLIER BANKS: DARING TO VENTURE
INTO TECHNOLOGY LENDING

Part I is organized as follows. Section I.A explains the
traditional banking business model, providing a contextual
backdrop against which to define the outlier banks. Section I.B
then identifies the outlier banks and distinguishes them from
traditional banks.
A.

Traditional Banks

Entrepreneurs know that if they walk into a bank asking
for a business loan, the bank will typically scrutinize the
“company’s history, business credit, revenues, balance sheet,” and
the entrepreneur’s equity contribution.27 For most entrepreneurs,
27 Eric Markowitz, 5 Tips for Using Collateral to Secure a Small-Business Loan,
INC. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.inc.com/guides/201101/5-tips-using-collateral-to-secure-asmall-business-loan.html [https://perma.cc/RD8Z-AE2N]; Dale Van Eckhout, Collateral and
Credit, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/offices/district/nd/fargo/resources/collateraland-credit [https://perma.cc/HU6Z-HHJ8] (“[C]ollateral’ . . . is still a basis for most loans
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they simply cannot fulfill the bank’s request because their
enterprise is too young to generate revenue or possess a business
history, business credit, and a balance sheet.28 The entrepreneur
may not be personally wealthy enough to provide equity
contributions to the enterprise that satisfy the bank’s requirements
for a loan.29 Moreover, as a typical startup in the innovation sectors,
the enterprise focuses on growth, not profitability.30
The entrepreneur may disclose to the bank that the
enterprise owns some patents and copyrights, and the entrepreneur
strongly believes that the intellectual property assets are very
valuable.31 Perhaps the entrepreneur insists that the intellectual
property assets are worthy enough to serve as collateral in assetbased lending.32 After all, asset-based lending is a common practice
where lenders provide a term loan or a line of credit at a percentage
of the assets, and the assets serve as collateral for the primary source
of repayment in the event of default.33
But the typical assets that banks accept in asset-based
lending are accounts receivable and inventory.34 That means the
company must have an established product in the marketplace
that is expected to generate revenue on a regular basis.35 That, in
turn, means the company has customers who have already relied
on and ordered the company’s products, and that the customers
made. Collateral serves as a secondary means of repaying the loan. The lender does not want
to own the collateral and wants the business to succeed. The borrower must put their assets
(collateral) at risk or in other words have ‘skin in the game’ in order to obtain the needed
financing for their business.”).
28 See Van Eckhout, supra note 27 (“Collateral includes assets such as real
estate and office or manufacturing equipment. Accounts receivable and inventory may
be pledged as collateral. Collateral may also include personal assets and commonly, a
second mortgage on a home.”). The entrepreneurs may not own a house or other real
estate to provide equity contributions.
29 See id.
30 PRACTICAL LAW CORPORATE & SECURITIES, STARTUP VENTURE FINANCE:
OVERVIEW (Westlaw w-000-4934).
31 See, e.g., U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE 43
(2011) (“[O]ne of a start-up’s most valuable assets may be its patent estate.”).
32 See Houman B. Shadab, Performance-Sensitive Debt: From Asset-Based
Loans to Startup Financing, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1077, 1134–36 (2014) (stating that tech
startups with intellectual property assets should use their assets in obtaining capital as
more lenders are willing to accept IP in asset-based lending).
33 Emma Bienias & Candice Cornelius, Financing Alternatives for Companies: Using
Intellectual Property as Collateral, STOUT (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.stoutadvisory.
com/insights/article/financing-alternatives-companies-using-intellectual-property-collateral
[https://perma.cc/3JAQ-3BBY] (“[A] company can borrow a percentage of the value of certain of
their IP assets using these intangible assets as collateral.”).
34 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK:
ASSET-BASED LENDING 3 (2017), https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/co
mptrollers-handbook/asset-based-lending/pub-ch-asset-based-lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS
D8-9XC2] [hereinafter OCC HANDBOOK].
35 In a revolving asset-based lending, the primary source of repayment is “the
conversion of the collateral to cash over the company’s business cycle.” Id. at 1–2.
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will soon pay the company for the outstanding accounts
receivable.36 The bank will then calculate a borrowing base,
typically 65 percent of the book value of eligible inventory and up
to 90 percent of eligible business-to-business accounts receivable.37
None of the asset-based lending with accounts receivable, however,
is applicable to the entrepreneur’s startup, as the young enterprise
is still pre-revenue.38 Likewise, asset-based loans with inventory as
the collateral are not applicable to the entrepreneur’s startup
because it is still working on perfecting the technology. The startup
has neither produced nor held inventory.
Banks are still very insistent on accounts receivable and
inventory as the common assets for asset-based lending. Banks
generally are not interested in accepting intellectual property
assets as collateral. For example, Bank of America Merrill Lynch
issued its white paper on asset-based lending and informed the
public that it does not make loans against patents and
copyrights, except for businesses the Bank views as “higher
quality companies.”39 In other words, patents, copyrights, and
other intellectual property are simply not the assets that banks
accept in asset-based lending.40 Trademarks, if they have
matured and transformed into brands with equity, may be
acceptable to banks in asset-based lending because the brands
are able to generate specific income and purchasers recognize
and trust the brands.41 This brand-dependent asset-based
lending is of no use to startups, however, as they and their
products, if they have any, are not known in the marketplace.
Moreover, if banks do accept intellectual property as
collateral, banks insist on having the intellectual property assets
appraised by independent experts when calculating the borrowing
base.42 But intellectual property valuation will not work for startups
36 “A revolving line of credit [ ] is the most common type of asset-based lending
(ABL)” and the borrowers are often wholesaler, distributor, or retailers. Id. at 3. Cash
from the sale of the inventory and collection of receivables (conversion of working assets)
is the typical source of repayment for a revolver. Id.
37 Id. at 17–19.
38 Banks simply cannot perform the intensive borrower analysis for assetbased lending as dictated in the OCC Handbook for asset-based lending. See id. at 7–19.
39 BANK OF AM. MERRILL LYNCH, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT ASSETBASED LENDING 5 (2014), http://www.ohiomfg.com/wp-content/uploads/01-13-17_lb_ta
x_FAQ-Asset-Based-Lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/54CR-CM64].
40 See id.
41 Banks restrict business loans to “higher quality companies with easily
recognizable brands that have value outside of the underlying products that represent
the brand.” Id.; see also Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Erik Hille, The Puzzle in Financing with
Trademark Collateral, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 365, 371 (2018).
42 See OCC HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 20 (“Lenders that finance intellectual
property need to maintain appropriate collateral valuation procedures for the type of
lending conducted, including appropriate third-party due diligence procedures for selecting
outside appraisers.”); Bienias & Cornelius, supra note 33 (“[A]n independent valuation of
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because the young enterprise’s technology is new and unproven, and
the enterprise does not have an established market.43 In addition,
the enterprise’s trademark is unknown in the marketplace; the
trademark is years from generating predictable income.44
Consequently, traditional banks reject startups’ intellectual
property as collateral in asset-based lending in the innovationintensive sectors because there is too much uncertainty when
valuing assets owned by startups without cash flow.45
Worse still, even in the rare case where a startup actually
has a stream of receivables and a positive cash flow, banks are
reluctant to approve business loans to a startup that possesses
no hard assets.46 In addition, the entrepreneurs at these
companies know all too well that if they ever approach a bank
for a loan to purchase office equipment, they would encounter
resistance.47 Banks may not flatly reject the equipment
financing deal with the entrepreneurs; they instead move at
“glacial speed” while the enterprise needs the loan much
sooner.48 Banks essentially discourage potential clients from
seeking out typical business loans.49
the IP is almost always necessary in order to establish the value of these assets for lending
purposes . . . . [V]aluations are a critical step in the process of lending against IP as they
are used to help determine how much a lender can lend against this asset class.”).
43 Under established methods of valuation, startups’ intellectual property
cannot be evaluated under the income method because there is no income.
44 Trademarks generate income through several ways. Trademark owners can
directly sell products and services in association with the trademarks. In order to strengthen the
trademarks in the marketplace, the owners typically promote the trademarked products and
services and employ various techniques to cultivate brand loyalty. See Deven R. Desai, From
Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981. 988–89 (2012) (“A company uses brands to provide
product information to consumers, but it also uses brands to enhance the overall corporate image
as the company pursues a full range of business goals.”). Another way to generate income from
trademarks is through licensing; Oliver Herzfeld, How to Establish A World-Class Corporate
Brand
Licensing
Program:
Part
3,
FORBES
(Sept.
18,
2017),
https://
www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/2017/09/18/how-to-establish-a-world-class-corporate-brand
-licensing-program-part-three/#14ab5e5378df [https://perma.cc/59A7-W3UA] (recognizing that
licensing generates new revenue streams for the business).
45 See generally Chris Donegan, How to Value Intellectual Property in a Startup, LINKEDIN (Oct. 4, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-value-intellectualproperty-start-up-dr-chris-donegan/ [https://perma.cc/7N2K-8Y7Z] (explaining the
difficulty of valuating startup’s intellectual property assets).
46 See generally Needleman, supra note 9 (reporting that startups with cash
flow turn to alternative lenders who pay “15% of the [business’s] invoices”).
47 Shannon Henry, Taking New Account of High-Tech Investment, WASH. POST
(Sept. 28, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1998/09/28/taking-new-a
ccount-of-high-tech-investment/1017c731-2e5d-4b85-8a1b-5dec2b33566a/?utm_term=.1b
27b7a018ea [https://perma.cc/TX87-BRQ4] (reporting that traditional banks ignore lending
to tech companies when they desperately need loans to purchase equipment for their fastgrowing companies).
48 Id.; see also Needleman, supra note 9.
49 Banks typically require business history, revenue, and valuable collateral for
business loans. Bank of America, for example, requires that in order for a business to obtain
a loan or a line of credit, the business must be under current ownership for at least two years
and has a minimum annual revenue of $250,000. Business Financing FAQs, BANK OF AM.,
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Peculiarly, on the one hand, banks decline to have
startups in tech and innovative centers across the nation as
clients by refusing to lend. On the other hand, banks themselves
have been under assault due, in part, to the onslaught of online
banking, payments by third party and alternative lenders, and
the rapidly shrinking number of banks.50 Yet banks continue to
focus on the traditional real estate market,51 provide loans to
established and mature companies,52 and finance asset-based
deals backed only by inventory and accounts receivables.53
B.

Identifying Outliers

While more than 99.9 percent of banks shun lending to
startups and high-growth companies in the innovation-intensive
https://www.bankofamerica.com/smallbusiness/business-financing/business-financing-loansfaqs/#smallBusinessEquipmentAndLOC [https://perma.cc/7N7W-PWSN]. Moreover, for a
line of credit of $100,000 or more, Bank of America requires that the business has a certificate
of deposit to serve as collateral. Id.
50 See Olivia Oran, Number of U.S. Bank Branches to Shrink 20 Percent in Five
Years: Real Estate Report, REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bankbranches/number-of-u-s-bank-branches-to-shrink-20-percent-in-five-years-real-estate-repo
rt-idUSKBN17Q28N [https://perma.cc/PN6B-XV6G] (reporting that bank branch reduction
is a way for the banking industry to further cut costs and footprint since the financial crisis);
Olivia Oran & Anjuli Davies, Big Banks See the Need to Shrink – But Face a Path Full of
Obstacles, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-soulsearchinginsight-idUSKCN0VS0FE [https://perma.cc/57V6-4LMP](reporting that banks experienced
“too low” returns and the banking business is in need of fundamental change); Bank Failures
in Brief – Summary 2001 through 2020, supra note 12 (noting that in 2010, 157 FDIC banks
failed); see also Rachel Louise Ensign et al., Banks Shutter 1,700 Branches in Fastest Decline
on Record, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-double-downon-branch-cutbacks-1517826601 [https://perma.cc/4WA3-44WD] (reporting the largest bank
decline on record, in addition to the massive closure of banks during and following the 2008
financial crisis); Forbes Fin. Council, Seven Big Changes Coming to the Banking Industry,
FORBES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2017/03/06/sevenbig-changes-coming-to-the-banking-industry/#24cf427b3402 [https://perma.cc/E3Z9-FBFE]
(identifying major disruptions that would change the banking industry, and that most of the
disruptions are driven by tech).
51 Banks Report Stronger Residential Mortgage Demand, ABA BANKING J. (Aug. 5,
2019), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2019/08/banks-report-stronger-residential-mortgage-de
mand/[https://perma.cc/4EPE-3NMF]; William Bennett & David Cacciapaglia, Demand for
Loans May Exceed Supply, GUGGENHEIM (May 24, 2016), https://www.guggenheimpar
tners.com/perspectives/sector-views/commercial-real-estate-debt-demand-for-loans-may-e
[https://perma.cc/R4QP-4UER].
52 See Business Financing FAQs, supra note 49. See generally Expected Lending
Practices in 2018 and a Review of Q4, ABRIGO (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.abrigo.com/blo
g/2018/02/26/expected-lending-practices-in-2018-and-a-review-of-q4// [https://perma.cc/688CUBMP] (reporting the Federal Reserve’s survey on banks’ commercial loans, commercial real
estate loans, consumer auto loans, and residential mortgages). Illustratively, Bank of America
explains the types of lending practices available to potential clients.
53 See 2nd Quarter ABL Advisor Deal Table, ABL ADVISOR (June 27, 2018),
http://www.abladvisor.com/deal-tables/2018/2 [https://perma.cc/52A9-HZWF] (providing all
asset-based lending deals for the second quarter of 2018); see also ABL Advisor Deal Tables,
ABL ADVISOR, http://www.abladvisor.com/loan-volume-report [https://perma.cc/6UJC-9N4R]
(reporting on the “domestic asset-based lending transaction[s]” from 2004 to 2016).
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sectors, there are outlier banks.54 But only four such outlier banks—
out of six thousand banks—devote themselves exclusively to serving
startups and high-growth companies in the tech industry.55
We have previously conducted an empirical study of all
banks and their lending activities to identify outlier banks.56 We
focused on banks and credit facilities that have accepted and
recorded patents as collateral for loans. As secured creditors, the
banks that had accepted patents as collateral for their loans
would file their security interests in the patent collateral with
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). We relied on
the USPTO patent assignments database to conduct our
searches for “security interest” in patents filed by banks from
1980 to 2016. We then aggregated the results for individual
banks. Among all banks, a group of banks with familiar names
dominates 90 percent of the patent collateral. These banks are
traditional banks with large asset size.57
Table 1 shows top banks that control 90 percent of the
market of lending with patents as collateral, 1980–2016 USPTO
data.58 These banks are also among the fifty largest banks in the
United States.59
Name
JPMorgan Chase
Bank of America
Citibank
Deutsche Bank
Wells Fargo
BNY Mellon
U.S. Bank
Silicon Valley Bank

Patent Collateral
180,598
163,673
69,848
65,354
54,174
44,775
38,315
28,019

Cumulative Percent
22%
42%
51%
59%
65%
71%
75%
79%

54 See Patent Aversion, supra note 14, at 164–65 (identifying typical traditional
banks that don’t lend to the sectors devoting to innovation).
55 Ari Levy, Out of the Way VCs: Banks Muscle in on Tech Boom, CNBC (Oct. 14,
2014), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/10/14/-as-banks-chase-boom.html [https://perma.cc/8DW
W-J9MF] (identifying SVB, Comerica, Bridge Bank, and Square 1 Bank as the tech banks).
In 2015, Square 1 merged with PacWest Bancorp. See PacWest Bancorp Announces the
Completion of Its Merger With Square 1 Financial, Inc., GLOBALNEWSWIRE (Oct. 7, 2015),
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2015/10/07/774141/0/en/PacWest-BancorpAnnounces-the-Completion-of-Its-Merger-With-Square-1-Financial-Inc.html [https://perma.c
c/EST9-UFTR]; Klingler & Hightower, supra note 12.
56 See Patent Aversion, supra note 14, at 152–65 (providing empirical data
showing banks refusing to lend to startups and tech companies).
57 Large Commercial Banks, FED. RESERVE, https://www.federalreserve.gov/rele
ases/lbr/current [https://perma.cc/L6AV-6W5U].
58 For an explanation of the methodology used to prepare this table see Patent
Aversion, supra note 14, at 142–52; see also Patent Assignment Dataset, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/pa
tent-assignment-dataset [https://perma.cc/8R82-MVHJ]; U.S. Patent Statistics Chart
Calendar Years 1963-2019, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/web/of
fices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm [https://perma.cc/NNC4-D5BJ].
59 See Large Commercial Banks, supra note 57.
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PNC Bank
Barclays Bank
ComericA Bank
BankMO Harris
City National RBC
Goldman Sachs Bank
HSBC Bank USA

21,071
17,357
11,938
10,690
7,601
6,376
6,360

81%
83%
85%
86%
88%
89%
90%

Table 2 shows the ratio of patent collateral per deal for
the top banks listed in Table 1 and the four outlier banks, 1980–
2016 USPTO data.60
Name
JPMorgan Chase
Bank of America
Citibank
Deutsche Bank
Wells Fargo
BNY Mellon
U.S. Bank
Silicon Valley Bank
PNC Bank
Barclays Bank
ComericA Bank
Bank of Montreal
Scotiabank
City National RBC
Goldman Sachs Bank
HSBC Bank USA
PacWest/Square 1 Bank
Western Alliance/ Bridge
Bank

Deals
3,504
5,106
404
1,197
2,962
717
953
2590
1,287
306
1,493
764
207
255
133
291
443
272

Patents Per Deal
51.54
32.06
172.89
54.60
18.29
62.45
40.20
10.82
16.37
56.72
8.00
13.99
45.86
29.81
47.94
21.86
7.49
6.54

In Table 2, Silicon Valley Bank, Comerica Bank, Pacific
Western Bank/Square 1 Bank and Western Alliance/Bridge Bank
are the outliers. These banks lend to companies that have few
patents per deal. That means they lend to startups, high-growth
companies with ownership of a small number of patents. Other
banks lend to established, legacy companies with substantially
larger patent portfolios.61 We confirmed our findings with other
publicly available information and publications.62 Overall, the
See id.
We have empirically conducted the study of all banks that have provided
loans with patents as collateral. Among the six thousand banks, we identified the outlier
banks. In addition, we have looked to economics theories to explain how outlier banks
execute their business model. Specifically, we apply signaling model to construct how
outlier banks reduce information asymmetry in selecting which startups that have
received VC backing to lend. See Signaling Model, supra note 15, at 213–34.
62 See Steve Daniels, Banks Plunge Into Tech Lending, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Jan. 10,
2015), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150110/ISSUE01/301109985/wintrust-privat
ebank-start-lending-to-tech-startups [https://perma.cc/7Z3Y-747Y] (identifying Silicon Valley
Bank and Square 1 Bank as the only two “players that focus strictly on tech” while Comerica
60
61
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outlier banks that dare to tread in technology lending are only a
handful. They include Silicon Valley Bank, Comerica Bank, Square
1 Bank,63 and Bridge Bank.64 Their business operations and
strategies are discussed in Part II.
II.

MAPPING IP VENTURE BANKING: INDUSTRIES AND
GEOGRAPHY

One of the puzzling characteristics of outlier banks is that
they are the typical commercial banks chartered by states, and are
members of the Federal Reserve Bank.65 That means they are just
like the rest of the other commercial banks; they are highly
regulated at both state and federal banking levels.66 As commercial
banks, they must be “99 percent right” in taking risks.67 While
meeting all the stringent banking regulations, outlier banks have
innovatively developed their core strategy in providing banking
products and services to VCs and their portfolio companies.
Specifically, the outlier banks lend to early-stage and late-growthstage companies that have already received backing from venture
bank is devoting to “later-stage tech startups”). In addition to these banks, other banks have
small segments of their business focusing on this new type of lending. Id.
63 Square 1 Bank became a division of Pacific Western Bank in 2015. Jeffrey
Marsico, What’s the Real Reason Square 1 is Selling to PacWest?, AM. BANKER (Mar. 16, 2015),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/whats-the-real-reason-square-1-is-selling-topacwest [https://perma.cc/PQ3D-8HHE].
64 Bridge Bank is a Division of Western Alliance Bank. See Eric Van Susteren,
Bridge Bank to be Acquired in $425M Deal, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Mar. 9, 2015),
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2015/03/09/bridge-bank-to-be-acquired-in425m-deal.html [https://perma.cc/35HE-33QU].
65 See SVB Fin. Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 7 (Feb. 28, 2017),
http://ir.svb.com/static-files/15a79750-925a-45a9-b1ca-ea4e575fe732 [https://perma.cc/H5ME24RE] (“We offer commercial and private banking products and services through our principal
subsidiary, Silicon Valley Bank . . . which is a California state-chartered bank founded in 1983
and a member of the Federal Reserve System.”); see also COMERICA BANK, COMERICA
INCORPORATED ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2017), https://investor.comerica.com/download/Comerica+
Incorporated+2017+Annual+Report-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GVX-H4SD] (“Comerica is
subject to supervision and regulation at the federal level by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (‘FRB’) under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended. Comerica
Bank is chartered by the State of Texas and at the state level is supervised and regulated by the
Texas Department of Banking.”); Corporate Profile, PACWEST BANCORP, http://www.pacwest
bancorp.com/ [https://perma.cc/TU7N-YANX] (“PacWest Bancorp (‘PacWest’) is a bank holding
company with approximately $26 billion in assets with one wholly-owned banking subsidiary,
Pacific Western Bank (the ‘Bank’). The Bank has 74 full-service branches located in California,
one branch in Durham, North Carolina, and one branch located in Denver, Colorado.”). Bridge
Bank is a Division of Western Alliance Bank, a member of the FDIC. Bridge Bank, WESTERN
ALLIANCE BANK, https://www.westernalliancebancorporation.com/bridge-bank-home?page=3
[https://perma.cc/99TD-82FK].
66 Julie Stackhouse, Why Are Banks Regulated?, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Jan.
31, 2017), https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2017/january/why-federal-reserve-regula
te-banks [https://perma.cc/73MV-TBV2] (acknowledging the highly regulated nature of the
banking business).
67 See Daniels, supra note 62 (reporting that banks in the niche of tech lending
“have to be 99 percent right”).
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capital firms.68 The outlier banks’ lending decisions are based on the
likelihood that the VC-backed companies will receive additional
rounds of equity capital from investors.69 In addition, the outlier
banks enjoy deposits from these companies.70 The outlier banks also
target particular industries and focus their businesses
geographically to facilitate lending within those industries.71 As
noted above, there are four such outlier banks.
A.

The Outlier Banks

The leader of this group of banks is Silicon Valley Bank
(SVB), a bank known as the bank for startups since its inception
in 1983.72 From its origin as a small community bank, SVB today
is among the top fifty largest banks in the United States.73 SVB
has distinguished itself since its inception as the go-to bank in the
technology lending space and has served more than forty
thousand startups.74 SVB dominates the innovation intensive
68 Specifically, outlier banks provide growth capital term loans, SAAS and
subscription lines of credit, equipment loans, working capital lines, international trade finance,
foreign currency and interest rate hedging, treasury management, executive and personal
banking services to startups, high growth companies and VC firms. See Building for Scale,
SILICON VALLEY BANK, https://www.svb.com/how-we-help-clients/building-scale/ [https://perma.
cc/9Z6C-E3W3] (providing SVB solutions to fast growth companies); PacWest Bancorp
Announces Quarterly Dividend, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 10, 2020), https://apnews.com/pressrelease/globenewswire-mobile/business-corporate-news-north-america-colorado-financial-serv
ices-0a458719156ac3820f01e7c79d7c46ca [https://perma.cc/ZLX2-J49H] (“Venture Banking
offers a comprehensive suite of financial services focused on entrepreneurial or ventured-backed
businesses and their venture capital and private equity investors, with offices located in key
innovation hubs across the United States.”); Gaining Traction, SILICON VALLEY BANK,
https://www.svb.com/how-we-help-clients/gaining-traction/
[https://perma.cc/N3NJ-8MNA];
SVB Startup Banking, SILICON VALLEY BANK, https://www.svb.com/how-we-help-clients/star
tup-banking/ [https://perma.cc/FS89-DRNV] (describing the types of services that SVB provides
specifically to startups); Technology & Life Sciences, COMERICA, https://www.comerica.
com/business/industry-solutions/Archive/technology-life-sciences-archive.html [https://perma.
cc/QN9F-7NSP].
69 See Derek Ridgley, Extend Your Startup’s Runway: How Venture Debt Works,
SILICON VALLEY BANK (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.svb.com/Blogs/Derek_Ridgley/Extend_you
r_startup_s_runway__How_venture_debt_works/ [https://perma.cc/W92Q-B2PK] (explaining
venture loan provided by SVB as based on “the borrower’s ability to raise additional capital to
fund growth and repay the debt”).
70 See Financial Services, SILICON VALLEY BANK, https://www.svb.com/how-we-helpclients/building-scale/financial-services/ [https://perma.cc/DN6S-NBGD] (listing financial
services that the banks provide to tech companies).
71 See infra Section II.B.
72 See Get to Know Us, SILICON VALLEY BANK, https://www.svb.com/newsroom/factsat-a-glance [https://perma.cc/4TH4-WKJR]; Levy, supra note 55.
73 Biggest US Banks by Asset Size (2019), MX (June 20, 2019), https://www.mx.c
om/moneysummit/biggest-banks-by-asset-size-united-states [https://perma.cc/BM6G-UD2F].
74 See
Silicon
Valley
Bank:
The
Founder’s
Story,
YOUTUBE
[https://perma.cc/YUQ9-2NPN]; see also Silicon Valley Bank Celebrates 30 Years of
Fueling Innovation Around the World, SILICON VALLEY BANK (Oct. 16, 2013),
https://www.svb.com/news/company-news/silicon-valley-bank-celebrates-30-years-offueling-innovation-around-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/5RCU-QDDC].
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sectors by lending to approximately 50 percent of all VC-backed
companies in the tech and life science sectors.75 It also counts twothirds of tech and life science companies with an IPO in 2017 as
clients.76 From Fitbit to Uber, SVB focuses its businesses
exclusively to serve entrepreneurs and their enterprises,
nurturing them in the early-growth, growth and late-growth
stages before initial public offering, as well as in post-IPO
phases.77 As of the first quarter of 2020, SVB has $75 billion in
assets, extending $36 billion in loans and holding $269 billion in
deposits and investments.78 The bank lends 94 percent to highgrowth and large companies and 6 percent to startups with
revenue less than five million dollars.79 In 2016, SVB’s stock rose
78 percent80 and 37 percent in 2017.81 During the Great Recession,
it was the only bank that escaped the crisis and made profits.82
ComericA, a Texas bank, is among the top thirty-five
largest U.S. financial holding companies with total assets of $73.3

75 See Facts at a Glance, SILICON VALLEY BANK, https://www.svb.com/newsroom/
facts-at-a-glance/ [https://perma.cc/U5DD-HESE].
76 See Jordan Wathen, SVB Financial Sees Earnings Surge in the Second Quarter,
MOTLEY FOOL (July 27, 2018), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/07/27/svb-financial-seesearnings-surge-in-the-second-qu.aspx [https://perma.cc/9AC9-AK7P] (reporting on SVB’s
earnings and dominance in tech lending).
77 See E. Scott Reckard, At Silicon Valley Bank, Risky Tech Start-Ups are Lucrative
Business, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-silicon-valleybank-20150807-story.html [https://perma.cc/6Z2Z-KG52] (reporting Silicon Valley Bank’s
unique role in nurturing its startups clients).
78 See Facts at a Glance, supra note 75.
79 Id. SVB also lends substantially to private equity firms. See SVB FIN. GRP, Q4
AND FY 2017 CORPORATE OVERVIEW AND FINANCIAL RESULTS 17 (2018), http://ir.svb.co
m/encrypt/files?file=nasdaq_kms/assets/2018/03/28/3-06-31/SVB_2017Q4IR_FILED.pdf&
file_alias=34946&companyid=SIVB&fileid=970620&filekey=0F3CAC72-2700-423B-8AAE181822CECECB&filename=SVB_2017Q4IR_FILED.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5UC-7S3M].
80 See Jack Willoughby, Why Silicon Valley Bank’s Stock Could Rise 25% More,
BARRON’S (Mar. 25, 2017), https://www.barrons.com/articles/why-silicon-valley-banks-stoc
k-could-rise-25-more-1490423621 [https://perma.cc/345M-ZCRL] (reviewing Silicon Valley
Bank’s performance).
81 SVB stock performance went from 177 per share on January 1, 2017 to 243 per
share on December 31, 2017. SVB Financial Group, https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/
stock/sivb [https://perma.cc/X8Q4-3M45].
82 Scott Duke Harris, Silicon Valley Bank Unscathed by Credit Crisis, MERCURY
NEWS (Nov. 6, 2008), http://www.mercurynews.com/2008/11/06/silicon-valley-bank-unscathedby-credit-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/P9VP-EVEF] (reporting that when SVB released its quarterly
report in late 2008, the bank “showed itself to be unscathed by the credit crisis. Chief Executive
Kenneth P. Wilcox sent an upbeat letter to about 11,000 clients, including many of the valley’s
tech and venture capital firms”); Nicholas Rossolillo, Forget Goldman Sachs, SVB Financial is
a Better Bank Stock, MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/
04/29/forget-goldman-sachs-svb-financial-is-a-better-ban.aspx [https://perma.cc/TPK9-CU49]
(“Even better than Goldman Sachs, though, was investment bank SVB Financial Group
(NASDAQ:SIVB), better known as the parent of Silicon Valley Bank. Over the past decade,
SVB’s stock has roughly tripled, which includes a nearly 30% fall from recent highs this year.
The regional institution is a top way to play investment banking in the tech- and start-up-rich
San Francisco Bay Area, and a better bank stock in general than most of its larger peers.”).
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billion as of December 31, 2019.83 The bank is known for its
Technology and Life Sciences group that has dedicated its
financial services to the “technology, life sciences and cleantech”
industries for more than twenty years and claims to understand
the “unique challenges entrepreneurs face.”84 ComericA counts
startups and high growth companies in software, SaaS, social
networking, business and IT services, cloud computing, mobile
computing, digital media and storage as its clients.85
Square 1 Bank, a division of Pacific Western or PacWest,
serves “entrepreneurs” located in various key innovation centers
across the United States.86 After the merger, PacWest develops a
“Venture Banking” division, concentrating in financial services to
clients in Life Sciences and Technology. Likewise, Bridge Bank
focuses on Life Sciences and Startup & Technology.87 As a division
of Western Alliance, Bridge Bank services its clients “located in
technology-centric regions of the country.”88 Bridge Bank
understands that its potential clients “disrupt” existing business and
technology norms and that Bridge Bank’s bankers craft “solutions
geared to technology businesses at every stage of the growth cycle.”89
B.

Industry and Geographic Focus of Outlier Banks

The outlier banks have extensive knowledge in four tech
industries:
software/internet,
life
science/healthcare,
hardware/infrastructure, and energy/resource innovation.90 To
83 See Large Commercial Banks, supra note 57; see also Technology & Life Sciences,
supra note 68 (“With more than two decades of experience, the Comerica Technology and Life
Sciences Division has a thorough understanding of the specific banking needs of technology and
life sciences companies. Comerica’s dedicated specialists also know the unique challenges
entrepreneurs face and work one-on-one to create proactive banking solutions that fit individual
needs. We’ve also developed relationships with top-tier investors who hold vested interests in
funding start-up and emerging companies like yours.”).
84 See Technology & Life Sciences, supra note 68.
85 See id.
86 Venture Lending, PACIFIC WESTERN BANK, https://www.pacwest.com/lending-s
olutions/venture-lending [https://perma.cc/YPE5-DLPN]; Life Sciences, PACIFIC WESTERN
BANK, https://www.pacwest.com/lending-solutions-venture-lending/life-sciences-venture-lendin
g [https://perma.cc/U7QZ-BVYG]; Square 1 Bank Acquired by PacWest Bancorp, CRUNCHBASE,
https://www.crunchbase.com/acquisition/pacwest-bancorp-acquires-square-1-bank—d7c4c984
[https://perma.cc/AB3P-J3U9].
87 Client Types, BRIDGE BANK, https://www.westernalliancebancorporation.com/brid
ge-bank-home/client-types [https://perma.cc/5A79-Q6UJ].
88 Services, BRIDGE BANK, https://www.westernalliancebancorporation.com/brid
ge-bank-home/about-us/company-overview [https://perma.cc/7ZXV-36LT].
89 See Client Types, supra note 87.
90 See Industries We Serve, SILICON VALLEY BANK, https://www.svb.com/industrieswe-serve/ [https://perma.cc/YBL2-AY52]. Likewise, Square 1 Bank (or PacWest’ Venture
Banking division) serves clients in technology, life sciences and startups. The Bank’s clients are
diverse, ranging from CallRail, Invoca, MapAnything, to Credit Karma. See Venture Lending,
supra note 86. Furthermore, Square 1 provides “nationwide focus on venture-backed companies
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serve these industries effectively, one of the outliers, SVB, has
offices in fifteen states and twenty-eight major U.S. technology
centers.91 The strategically selected states with known technology
centers, in alphabetical order, are Arizona, California, Colorado,
Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and
Washington.92 Unlike the typical commercial bank with branches
for retail banking, SVB has no branches in fifteen of the sixteen
states it serves; SVB’s offices devote all of their operations to serve
the tech industry.93
Overall, the outlier banks cultivate unique relationships
with VC firms and follow the VCs geographically to provide
lending and banking services to both the VCs and their portfolio
companies.94 Silicon Valley Bank, for example, follows the VCs
by having bank offices in London, Beijing, Shanghai, Dublin,
and Tel Aviv.95 Square 1 Bank/PacWest extends funding to
venture capital and private equity firms through lending
products and services that are flexible and with speed.96
ComericA financial advisors “help plan, guide and consult tech
businesses and venture capitalists on planning, projecting,
growing and protecting their earnings, every step of the way.”97

and venture capital firms . . . . [in] a network of 80 branches.” See PacWest Bancorp Announces
the Completion of Its Merger With Square 1 Financial, Inc., supra note 55.
91 For SVB offices in innovation centers in the United States, see SVB Locations,
SILICON VALLEY BANK, https://www.svb.com/locations.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZE99-TCZK];
Get to Know Us, SILICON VALLEY BANK, https://www.svb.com/newsroom/facts-at-a-glance/
[https://perma.cc/S2RX-7EPW].
92 See SVB Locations, supra note 91.
93 California is the only state where SVB has branches. Id.
94 See Client Types, supra note 87 (“Bridge Bank’s Life Sciences Group (LSG)
understands the unique challenges our client companies face bringing their products from the
lab to market. Whether biotechnology, medical devices, or pharma, these companies can face
uncertainties that would make less experienced bankers uneasy.”); Private Equity & Venture
Capital, BRIDGEBANK, https://www.westernalliancebancorporation.com/bridge-bank-home/clie
nt-types/private-equity-and-venture-capital [https://perma.cc/8A7B-7UDZ] (“In addition to
providing a comprehensive suite of banking services, the Equity Fund Resources group fosters
an eco-system for equity fund partners, CFOs, managers, and their portfolio companies –
working to bring forward creative networking and mutually-beneficial opportunities for
growth.”).
95 See SVB Locations, supra note 91.
96 VC/PE Fund Finance, PACIFIC WESTERN BANK, https://www.pacwest.com/l
ending-solutions/fund-finance [https://perma.cc/MKY3-W9GC] (“Fueling growth through
fund-focused solutions. Venture capital and private equity investors have unique, complex
needs. You need a banking partner who understands those needs and executes solutions with
flexibility and speed. Our Fund Finance group is a national network of experienced banking
professionals dedicated to meeting the needs and strategic focus of your firm.”).
97 To Grow to the Next Level, Move Beyond Everyday Banking, COMERICA,
https://www.comerica.com/business/industry-solutions/specialized-industries/technology.html
[https://perma.cc/9QVA-3C2L] [hereinafter Beyond Everyday Banking].
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FOLLOWING THE VC DEALS

One of the key characteristics of outlier banks in IP
Venture Banking is the relationship between the banks and their
VC clients.98 In fact, the banks follow their VC clients for several
important reasons. The banks rely on the VCs for knowledge,
due diligence, networking, client development, and repayment
of the loans made to the VC-backed companies.
A.

Gaining VCs’ Knowledge and Tapping into VC-Backed
Clients

The VCs are firms that invest in a roster of portfolio
companies, which the VCs nurture99 for scale and exit strategy.100
The outlier banks, by providing banking services to the VCs,
learn the ecosystem inhabited by VCs and entrepreneurs at the
portfolio companies.101 With that knowledge, and through the VC
relationship, the outlier banks gain both the entrepreneurs and
their startup business or high growth companies as clients.102 In
addition to their connections to VCs, the outlier banks cultivate
relationships and partnerships with private equity, corporate
ventures, and angel investors, and, through them, gain new
clients who are the new enterprises in innovative tech and life
science sectors.103 For example, on its website SVB touts its
partnerships with private equity and venture capital firms:
Close relationships between investors and lenders are known in tech financing. See
Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134, 162 (1999).
99 See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1071 (2003); Elizabeth Pollman, Information
Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 184 (2012) (stating that the VC, as the
general partners of venture capital funds, would select “the portfolio companies for the
fund, and nurtures and supports them by contributing money and often services or advice
that the companies need in order to develop”).
100 See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1, 10–11 (2012) (noting that among the exiting events, IPO is the ultimate VC success);
D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 317 (2005)
(studying the 367 venture-backed companies and analyzing the exit structure of venture
capital relationship).
101 The outlier banks often list the names of the VCs as their clients and boast
that they know the VCs and their portfolio companies. See Beyond Everyday Banking,
supra note 97; Client Types, supra note 87; Get to Know Us, supra note 91.
102 For example, on July 17, 2018, the startup Inkbox that merges biotech with
fashion and lifestyle, raised $13 million in Canadian dollars from VC firms for Series A
round, and on July 18, 2018, the startup received $4 million for loans from Silicon Valley
Bank. See Inkbox, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/inkbox#sectio
n-locked-marketplace [https://perma.cc/W7UV-4E8H].
103 See Industries We Serve, supra note 90; Is Silicon Valley Bank Facing Future
Trouble? PYMNTS (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.pymnts.com/news/2015/is-silicon-valley-bankfacing-future-trouble/ [https://perma.cc/KMT2-RELA] (reporting that Bessemer Venture
Partners “leads startups” to the Bank); Silicon Valley Bank Recent News & Activity,
CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/silicon-valley-bank/timeline/timeli
98
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Succeeding in venture capital and private equity investing is more
complex than ever. Competition for the best companies is fierce, and
the entrepreneurial ecosystem is expanding globally. Private
investment firms need a bank that knows their world intimately and
can help them take a strategic approach to managing capital. SVB
makes a natural partner for venture capital, private equity, corporate
venture and angel investors. We offer a suite of financial services with
one goal in mind—helping seize opportunities. We provide unique
insights for firms and their portfolio companies. And, through SVB
Capital, they can leverage our deep expertise to construct
concentrated portfolios that help meet investment goals.104

Likewise, ComericA Bank advertises that its financial
advisors have the expertise to assist both venture capitalists and
companies in the tech sector.105 Bridge Bank formed the Equity
Fund Resources group to serve as the “central hub” to the VC
and private equity communities and provides services to
“investment funds and their portfolio companies.”106 Similarly,
Bridge Bank lists “Venture Capital & Private Equity” in
addition to Startups & Technology, Life Sciences, and others it
serves.107 Bridge Bank claims the motto “[t]he smarter banking
choice for growing technology companies.”108
B.

Relying on VCs for Their Due Diligence

As outlier banks are commercial banks regulated under
strict banking laws and regulations, the banks must exercise
extreme caution in selecting young tech companies to be clients,
avoiding running afoul of bank regulators.109 The outlier banks rely
on the VCs, preferably the top tier VCs,110 for their due diligence to
filter out the startups.111 To fully understand how outlier banks
ne#section-recent-news-activity [https://perma.cc/Y93S-HW6F] (noting the breadth of Silicon
Valley Bank’s news and recent activities in tech financing and the Bank’s wide network);
Stephen Levin, Venture Debt: Device Financing Lifeline or Anchor?, IN VIVO: THE BUS. & MED.
REP., Mar. 2008, at 50, 52 (“Banks . . . often use venture lending as a means of attracting new
customers for their other banking services and therefore frequently include in their deals a
covenant requiring the start-up to keep all of its cash with the lending institution.”).
104 See Industries We Serve, supra note 90.
105 See Beyond Everyday Banking, supra note 97.
106 Venture Capital and Private Equity, WESTERN ALLIANCE BANCORPORATION,
https://www.westernalliancebancorporation.com/our-expertise/venture-capital-privateequity [https://perma.cc/6FV3-B4WH].
107 See Client Types, supra note 87.
108 Startups & Technology, BRIDGEBANK, https://www.westernalliancebancorporatio
n.com/bridge-bank-home/client-types/startups-and-technology [https://perma.cc/LT8N-TJHX].
109 See Daniels, supra note 62 (stating that lending to tech startups is not “for
the faint of heart” as “it requires experience” and that bank must be absolutely right in
their lending decisions).
110 Lenders rely on the identity of the VCs as a signal of the startup’s quality. See
Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1190–91 (2010).
111 For a discussion of due diligence VCs must conduct in selecting startups for
investment, see Brief of Amici Curiae Venture Capital Firms Aberdare Ventures et al.
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depend on VCs in selecting to which startups to lend, a look at the
funding statistics and VC due diligence is prudent.
Globally, the number of newly created businesses
approximates 100 million annually.112 In the United States,
there were 8,751,000 new startups in 2017.113 As of 2018, the
total number of all small businesses operating in the United
States is 30.2 million.114 Startups generally suffer large failure
rates. For example, “of all businesses started in 2014, 80 percent
made it to the second year”, “70 percent” to the third year, “62
percent” to the fourth year, and “56 percent” to the fifth year.115
Without financing, startups wither. When an
entrepreneur forms a startup, the first source of funding
typically comes from the entrepreneur’s personal savings and
credit, family, and friends.116 If the startup is able to survive and
advance, it must next obtain outside funds in the form of seed
money from incubation funds or angel funding.117 The rare and
fortunate few among startups can then attract funding from VC
firms.

in Support of Respondents at 12–14, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 564 U.S. 91 (2011) (No.
10-290), 2011 WL 1042210.
112 Clara Guibourg, This Chart Shows Just How Many Startups Are Launched
Worldwide Every Second, CITY A.M. (July 23, 2015), http://www.cityam.com/
220819/graphic-shows-just-how-many-startups-are-launched-worldwide-every-second
[https://perma.cc/E3V7-3Q7Z].
113 See Barb Darrow, Why It’s a Good Time to Start Your Own Company, FORTUNE
(Feb. 22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/22/startups-2017-challenger/ [https://perma.c
c/8JMB-6F8N].
114 106 Must-Know Startup Statistics for 2019, EMBROKER https://www.embroke
r.com/blog/startup-statistics#ss-1 [https://perma.cc/7ZL2-EQLA] (providing the statistics and
trends of startups).
115 Matt Mansfield, Startup Statistics-The Numbers You Need to Know, SMALL BUS.
TRENDS (Mar. 28, 2019), https://smallbiztrends.com/2016/11/startup-statistics-small-business
.html [https://perma.cc/NK6T-E9QG].
116 Martin Zwilling, The Right Way to Get Funding From Family and Friends, FORBES
(Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/martinzwilling/2016/08/23/the-right-way-to-getfunding-from-family-and-friends/#17420a634a29 [https://perma.cc/UJF4-HS3Z] (stating that
funding from family and friends can serve as evidence that “people who know you well are
willing to bet on you, even before your idea has a chance to show traction”); The Ins and Outs of
Raising Money from Friends and Family, ENTREPRENEUR, https://www.entrepreneur.com/a
rticle/228103 [https://perma.cc/PPR4-UGNE]; Gary Schall, Want to Ruin Your Relationships?
Ask Family and Friends to Fund Your Startup, XCONOMY (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://xconomy.com/boston/2017/01/19/want-to-ruin-your-relationships-ask-family-andfriends-to-fund-your-startup/ [https://perma.cc/4H23-FHZ4].
117 Friends and Family Round vs. Angel Round, DLA PIPER, https://www.dlap
iperaccelerate.com/knowledge/2018/friends-and-family-round-vs-angel-round.html
[https://perma.cc/C6N8-HRUW] (discussing the two rounds of early-stage financing that are
common for startups). Universities have also become a source of incubation funds. See About,
DUKE INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, https://entrepreneurship.duke.edu/incubati
onfund/ [https://perma.cc/35BJ-7J2Q]; The Dean’s Fund for Scientific Advancement:
Incubation Award, HARV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/researchstrategy-and-development/incubation-award/ [https://perma.cc/F9W5-PGD2].
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Startups’ funding statistics are a sobering reminder of the
competitive nature of obtaining funding. Of all the startups in
2013, only 0.05 percent received VC funding and 1 percent
received angel funding.118 Angel investors invested in 61,900
companies with the average amount of $74,955.119 But, for the
fortunate few of all startups that received VC funds—a total of
3,700 companies in 2012—the average investment by VCs was
$5.94 million.120 In other words, angel investors write sixteen
checks for every check VCs write, but the average amount from
angel investors is extremely small compared to VC’s funding
rounds.121 Breaking down the VC-funded companies further, early
stage companies received an average of $2.6 million from VCs.122
The numbers above, though sobering, dovetail with the
outlier banks’ strategy: since the VCs have already conducted
their due diligence in their own selection of worthy startups for
funding—as seen by the mere 0.05 percent of startups selected to
receive VC money—the banks reduce the risks of default by
lending to only the VC-backed startups. Indeed, banks know that
while top tier VCs tolerate higher levels of risk, they still must be
very careful in their lending decisions.123 Only startups that
represent potentially the most disruptive and best technology can
secure pitch meetings with top-tier VCs. Out of 100 pitches, VCs
select only ten startups for further scrutiny.124 Through intensive
due diligence, VCs then narrow the ten investment opportunities
even further, ultimately funding only one.125
VCs conduct a “thorough due diligence process on the
entrepreneur or scientist, the technology and the potential
market.”126 The due diligence focuses on minimizing risks by
aiming to address questions such as, “Does the technology work?
Is there a market for it? Is the market accessible? Who are the
118 Laura Entis, Where Startup Funding Really Comes From (Infographic),
ENTREPRENEUR
(Nov.
20,
2013),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/230011
[https://perma.cc/K2Z2-HC7D].
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.; see also Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 717, 739–44 (2010) (defining angel investors, their investments in startups,
and the history of angel investing).
122 See Entis, supra note 118.
123 See Brief of Amici Curiae Venture Capital Firms Aberdare Ventures et al.
in Support of Respondents, supra note 111.
124 Id. at 13.
125 Id.; see also Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities
Regulations Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 125–26 (2010)
(stating that VC funds stage their investments by tying the funds to specified milestones
to mitigate information asymmetry and uncertainty).
126 See Brief of Amici Curiae Venture Capital Firms Aberdare Ventures et al.
in Support of Respondents, supra note 111, at 13.
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competitors? Does the entrepreneur have the skills to bring the
concept to the market?”127 Moreover, for startups with technology
in regulated industries, VCs focus on additional risks: “Can
clinical trials be conducted? Will they be successful? Can
regulatory approval be obtained?”128
The level of due diligence conducted by VCs is extensive
and costly.129 Outlier banks simply can neither afford to conduct
the same nor absorb the cost. Nor can the banks then pass the
cost on to the startups or high growth companies.130 That would
make the total cost of the loan prohibitive for potential tech clients
whose resources are concentrated on growth, not high loan costs
and fees.131 To minimize the total cost of the loan, outlier banks
leverage their unique relationship with VCs and depend on the
VCs for their due diligence in selecting potential clients from
among the startups that have already received VC funding.132
C.

Depending on VCs for the Next Round of Funding for
Payments on Loans to Startups and High-Growth
Companies

Outlier banks face the same concern as any commercial
banks when they lend: the risk that their loans will not get

Id.
Id.; see also Cable, supra note 125, at 126 (noting that among the VC funds
investing together, there is a lead VC who is responsible for due diligence and negotiation of
investment terms). That means syndication VC investments increase the level of expertise and
reduce the cost and risks. Id. Outlier banks, however, cannot adopt the same syndication model
for a term loan to a startup because syndicated loan typically occurs “when a project requires too
large a loan for a single lender.” Troy Segal, Syndicated Loan, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/syndicatedloan.asp [https://perma.cc/X5RT-VJ7Z].
129 Asher Bearman, Understanding VC Financings – Transaction Costs and
Attorney Fees, DLA PIPER: VENTURE ALLEY (Apr. 21, 2011), https://www.theventurealley.c
om/2011/04/understanding-vc-financings-transaction-costs-and-attorney-fees/
[https://perma.cc/L5AB-UWU8] (stating that the cost and fees can reach beyond $100,000,
depending on the complexity of the due diligence).
130 See The Due Diligence Process in Venture Capital (VC), MARS, https://www.ma
rsdd.com/mars-library/the-due-diligence-process-in-venture-capital/ [https://perma.cc/NV8HD9BL] (describing the various types of due diligence involved in VC financing).
131 A loan from SVB to a startup or high-growth company that has already received
VC funding is inexpensive. See SILICON VALLEY BANK & MINDBODY, INC., LOAN AND
SECURITY AGREEMENT 1–2 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1458962/0
00119312515182221/d879972dex1014.htm [https://perma.cc/FPD8-SDCE] (SVB’s Loan
Agreement with 3.25% interest rate). Likewise, Comerica charges 0.50% above the Prime
Rate. See COMERICA BANK & BAZAARVOICE, INC., LOAN AND SECURITY AGREEMENT 1 (2007),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1330421/000119312511233414/dex1030.htm
[https://perma.cc/7EYK-PGNG].
132 See generally Signaling Model, supra note 15, at 232–33 (demonstrating
through economic model the extent to which banks can trust VCs in making their lending
decisions to startups).
127
128
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repaid.133 But a tech startup’s business model is about trying to
perfect its technology and succeed at specific milestones for high
growth.134 This means the startup is constantly in need of cash
infusion and is not in the position to be paying back a loan even if
it could obtain such a loan.135 The only way for outlier banks to
lend to a startup is if there is a strong likelihood that the startup
will pay back the loan.136 That can only happen if there is a strong
likelihood that the startup will receive funding from outside
investors.137 This is when the next round of VC funding comes in
to provide the startup the needed cash infusion and to pay back
the loans to outlier banks.138
Consequently, relying on the VCs for their due diligence
alone is not sufficient to ascertain whether the startup, which
has already received funding from the VCs, will pay back the
loan, because the VCs may abandon the startup, or other VCs
may not be interested in joining the original VCs to provide the
133 “Commercial banks are highly regulated” by the Federal Reserve and the
FDIC and therefore they have a “much lower risk threshold.” Investment Banks vs.
Commercial Banks: What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.in
vestopedia.com/ask/answers/061615/whats-difference-between-investment-banks-andcommercial-banks.asp [https://perma.cc/R8F7-SDSC]. The 1933 Banking Act “created the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to insure deposits in banks, compelled
national banks to comply with federal regulations, and imposed restrictions on how much
commercial banks could lend.” Maria Krambia-Kapardis, Contributing to Financial Crisis
Prevention Through Banking and Financial Services Regulation, 35 BANKING & FIN.
SERVS. POL’Y REP. 1 (2016). Commercial banks employ many different models to minimize
their risks. See, e.g., Jon Kibbe, Participations in Commercial Bank Loans, 65 CONSUMER
FIN. L. Q. REP. 272 (2011); Stephen A. Lumpkin, The Integration of the Corporate Bond and
Commercial Loan Markets, 85 FIN. MKT. TRENDS 51 (2003) (observing that more
commercial banks today participate in loan syndications to reduce their financial risk);
Emilios Avgouleas & Jay Cullen, Excessive Leverage and Bankers’ Pay: Governance and
Financial Stability Costs of a Symbiotic Relationship, 21 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 29–30 (2014)
(illustrating that large U.S. commercial banks rely on “securitization of debt and the use of
off-balance-sheet vehicles [that] mask[ ] true leverage levels”).
134 Tech startups receive their financing from investors in stages tied to meeting
specific milestones. See Jennifer S. Fan, Catching Disruption: Regulating Corporate
Venture Capital, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 341, 372–73 (2018) (explaining how a startup
is closely monitored by VCs in staged financing). See generally Gilson, supra note 99, at
1078–83 (providing a comprehensive explanation of staged funding and control in VC
and portfolio company’s relationship).
135 Prime Equity Fund, LP. v. Lichtman (In re Lichtman), 388 B.R. 396, 402
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008) (describing the failed company was “a new startup with its
existence dependent upon continued cash infusions from investors”); see also John F.
Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66 HASTINGS L. J.
133, 151–52 (2014) (discussing the purpose of bridge loans that allow the startups to
have a few additional months of runway in the hope it will reach targeted milestones, to
obtain the next round of capital, or to find a new buyer for the struggling company).
136 See Ridgley, supra note 69 (stating that Silicon Valley Bank works “with more than
half of the U.S. venture capital-backed companies,” that venture debt has been “a core part” of
the bank’s “lending practice for decades”, and that that the making the loan is conditioned on
“the borrower’s ability to raise additional capital to fund growth and repay the debt”).
137 Id.
138 Id.; see Ibrahim, supra note 110, at 1173 (explaining how venture debt helps
entrepreneurs and investors).
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startup with the next round of funding.139 In other words, to
ensure the likelihood that outlier banks can get paid on loans to
startups, the banks must have comfortable certainty that the
startup that has just received Series A funding from VCs will be
likely to receive Series B funding from the same VCs and,
perhaps, additional VCs.140
Startups that have received VC funding for Series A have
only a 50 percent chance to survive to the next round of Series B
funding.141 That means the outlier banks cannot lend to just any
startups that have received Series A funding, as it is still too
risky for default.142 There is information asymmetry that outlier
banks face because the startups and the VCs simply know more
about the startup’s situation than the outlier banks.143 To
overcome the information asymmetry problem, the outliers must
cultivate and build a uniquely strong relationship with the VCs,
as well as a nurturing relationship with the startups.144 In our
companion paper, we have identified quality signals banks can
rely on to independently verify the likelihood that the VC-backed
companies will secure the next round of VC funding.145
D.

Connecting Startups to Networks of Experts

In a typical banking relationship, a bank may learn how
well a client is doing by monitoring the client’s banking activities
with the bank.146 After all, the client has their deposit accounts
139 See Gilson, supra note 99, at 1073 (stating that the overall investment in startups
by VCs are “syndicated with other venture capital funds that invest in the portfolio company”).
140 See generally Signaling Model, supra note 15, at 224–27 (identifying and
proving signals that banks can rely on to ensure certainty that their loans will be repaid).
141 Sebastian Quintero, Dissecting Startup Failure Rates by Stage, MEDIUM
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://towardsdatascience.com/dissecting-startup-failure-by-stage-34bb
70354a36 [https://perma.cc/9K3W-QDGP] (analyzing Crunchbase data for startups and
showing that the failure rate from Series A to B is 50%, from B to C is 55.8%, from C to
D is 62.1%, from D to E is 66.4%, and so forth).
142 Id.
143 See Signaling Model, supra note 15, at 210.
144 See Reckard, supra note 77 (reporting how Silicon Valley Bank nurtures its
startup clients). In many ways, the outlier banks behave similar to their VC clients who
also nurture their own portfolio startup companies. The non-monetary assistance that
outlier banks provide to their VC-backed startup clients is similar to the noncash
contributions that VCs provide to their portfolio companies. See Gilson, supra note 99, at
1072 (stating that VCs provide important noncash contribution to their portfolio startups,
including “management assistance, corresponding to that provided by management
consultants; intensive monitoring of the portfolio company’s performance which provides
an objective view to the entrepreneur; and the use of the fund’s reputation to give the
portfolio company credibility with potential customers, suppliers, and employees”).
145 See Signaling Model, supra note 15, at 224–29.
146 Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private
Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 125 (2009) (stating that banks’
“institutional arrangements facilitate their garnering of private information about their
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and uses the bank to manage payments and finances.147 The
bank is therefore informed in deciding whether it should make
a loan to an existing client. The outlier banks in IP Venture
Banking are able to acquire pertinent information about the
startup’s business and financial condition if the startup has
become a client for a suite of banking activities with the outlier
bank.148 Relying on the knowledge gained through client banking
products, the outlier banks can evaluate whether to make a loan
to their startup clients.149 However, that knowledge alone is still
insufficient in IP Venture Banking because there remains a risk
that the VCs will not fund the next round.150 In other words, the
startup’s past banking activities as seen on the bank’s computer
monitor within the comfort of the bank’s office are not a
guarantee that a cash infusion is around the corner. To mitigate
risks, the outlier banks must be more than the typical banker
sitting inside his or her office.151
Consequently, in addition to serving the lender role, the
outlier banks must also function as part cheerleader, part
mentor, and part counselor to the entrepreneurs in nurturing
borrower firms at lower cost than other investors, and banks have strong incentives to
monitor these firms and influence managerial decisionmaking when necessary”).
147 Banks monitor their clients’ activities by requiring them to have deposit
accounts with the banks. See Joanna M. Shepherd et. al., What Else Matters for
Corporate Governance?: The Case of Bank Monitoring, 88 B.U. L. REV. 991, 995 (2008)
(“[A] bank lender often requires its borrower to maintain its deposit accounts with the
bank, an arrangement that enables the bank to monitor its borrower’s cash flow.”).
148 See Ridgley, supra note 69 (stating that most of the VC-backed portfolio companies
are also Silicon Valley Bank clients). The Bank provides banking services to early stage founders
called SVB StartUp which includes business checking account, SVB Online Banking for cash
management, foreign exchange, customized reporting and account alerts with connections to
QuickBooks, Xero, Expensify, among others. The Bank does not charge fees to founders for using
the services for their startups. See SVB Startup Banking, supra note 68.
149 See Tung, supra note 146 (“The bank also enjoys access to private
information about the borrower’s business activities, including periodic reports from the
borrower and access to the borrower’s management and books and records. The bank
may enjoy specialized expertise concerning the borrower’s industry.”); see also George G.
Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83
CALIF. L. REV 1073, 1080 (1995) (“A bank may respond by scaling down or terminating
its relations with the borrower (exit). Alternatively, the bank may use its threat of exit
to intervene in the decisions of the firm (voice).”).
150 See Mann, supra note 98, at 158 (stating that there is no legal obligation for
the VCs to pay the banks the loans that they have made to the VCs’ portfolio companies).
Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 261-64 (1998) (discussing
that banks and the VCs do not have explicit contracts regarding the bank loans to
portfolio companies); Coyle & Green, supra note 135 (stating that struggling companies
may continue to operate for a few months while the VC managers are not providing the
next round of funding but are attempting to exit by seeking a potential acquirer). For
more comprehensive coverage of lending to small businesses in general, see Ronald J.
Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO. L. J. 1, 23 (1997).
151 See Reckard, supra note 77 (reporting that Silicon Valley Bank “veers far
from the course of conventional financial institutions”).
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the startups to success.152 To do so, the outlier banks rely on the
VCs for connections to networks of experts that are helpful to
the young tech enterprises.153 The bottom line is that if the
entrepreneurs are successful, their enterprises will meet their
milestones, obtain the next round of VC funding, and pay the
loans and associated costs to the outlier banks.154 In other words,
it is in the outlier banks’ best interest to develop and maintain
networks of experts in assisting the entrepreneurs.155 Through
the uniquely strong relationship between the outlier banks and
their VC clients, the outlier banks are exposed to the networks
of experts who work with VCs or are within the various VC
circles, and vice versa.156 The outlier banks can leverage their
connection with the experts to introduce the entrepreneurs to
the most relevant and helpful experts in fulfilling the outlier
banks’ efforts to act as cheerleaders, mentors, and counselors.157
In summary, looking beyond the assertions on the
website of each outlier bank, the relationship between the
outlier bank and VCs is uniquely intertwined with the funding
cycle that ultimately results in the outlier banks receiving a
handsome return. The outlier banks know the venture
capitalists and firms. They gain knowledge about the technology
sectors and industries and the ecosystem in which
entrepreneurs and the VCs exist. The outlier banks provide
banking services to the VC firms. They attend VC meetings and
presentations. They network with experts, tech executives,
mentors, and entrepreneurs. They follow their VC clients’ trail.
If the venture capitalist goes abroad for deals, they follow to
make loans overseas and accept deposits from new clients in
152 Id. (stating that as “[p]art lender, part consultant, part cheerleader and part
investor, Silicon Valley Bank has been a nursemaid to countless startups — Airbnb,
Fitbit, Pinterest and TrueCar, to name some recent ones”).
153 Id. (reporting that Silicon Valley Bank’s success is from “the relationships” the
Bank has developed “over the years” and the Bank has a “well-connected network of outside
experts, mentors, tech executives, venture capitalists and current and former clients ready
to help its upstart entrepreneurs — no matter how farfetched an idea might seem”).
154 Id. (noting that Silicon Valley Bank is “more willing than others to focus on a
start-up’s growth prospects rather than its current financial condition and to lend money
so businesses can expand while awaiting the next round of venture capital funding”).
155 Id.
156 See Willoughby, supra note 80 (“[The Bank has] long-term relationships with
venture-capital and private-equity specialists, technology, life-sciences and health-care
companies, and even Napa Valley wineries. It lends to these borrowers, at times taking
small equity stakes, and provides money-management services to clients.”). Also, Silicon
Valley Bank boasted that when VCs become the Bank’s clients, the VCs will be “part of a
community that can help set new ideas in motion. We make it easy for you to develop
meaningful, long-lasting connections with your peers.” Private Equity & Venture Capital,
SILICON VALLEY BANK, https://www.svb.com/how-we-help-clients/private-equity-venturecapital/ [https://perma.cc/PA9C-J7GM].
157 See Reckard, supra note 77.
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other countries. They have their offices in London, Beijing,
Shanghai, Ireland, Israel, and wherever their VC clients form
new ecosystems with new entrepreneurs.158
IV.

THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF WARRANTS AS THE IP PROXY

Part IV is organized as follows. Section IV.A provides a
description of how warrants work and explains why startups
provide warrants to outlier banks. Section IV.B explains why
startups demand warrants from outlier banks. It follows with a
survey of several such warrant-based deals in order to
illuminate some nuances that occur in these transactions.
A.

Why Do Startups Provide Warrants to Outlier Banks?

From the startup’s perspective, why does a startup take
on a venture loan from outlier banks when they must issue a
warrant to them? What are the costs and benefits to the startup?
To answer these questions, consider a hypothetical offered
by SVB. Assume that the startup has just received a Series A
round of $10 million from a VC.159 Typically, VC investors will
take “20 percent ownership (on a fully diluted basis)”160 in the
enterprise, rendering the total valuation of the enterprise at $50
million (20 percent of $50 million is $10 million of the VC fund).161
As startups generally burn lots of cash to meet their milestones,
for our purpose, we assume that the enterprise’s monthly cash
burn rate is $1 million. The $10 million Series A will allow the
enterprise to survive for 10 months.162 What if the enterprise is
unable to meet some of its milestones and needs two or three
additional months before it can reach the Series B round? To
ameliorate the problem, the enterprise could have approached an
outlier bank immediately after it obtained the Series A funding,
when the enterprise was awash in cash and confidence, and
requested a venture loan of $3 million to be drawn later.163 That
158 VC geography concentrates in Silicon Valley, the Route 128 area near
Boston, Texas, Washington, D.C., New York, and other areas. See Cable, supra note 125,
at 114–15. Outlier banks follow the VC geography by opening their offices in the same
states and technology centers.
159 The example is based on SVB’s. See Ridgley, supra note 69.
160 For an explanation of “fully diluted” shares and ownership, see Issued and
Outstanding Shares Versus Fully Diluted Shares, LATHAMDRIVE, https://www.latha
mdrive.com/resources/insights/issued-and-outstanding-shares-versus-fully-diluted-shares
[https://perma.cc/RT7A-JXZM].
161 See Ridgley, supra note 69.
162 Id.
163 It may sound counterintuitive to approach the outlier bank for a loan when
the enterprise has just received a round of VC funding, but outlier banks have advised

162

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

means the enterprise would have three extra months of cash burn
to lengthen its runway by 30 percent in order to meet its
milestones and reach the Series B round.164
In exchange for 30 percent additional runway, the
enterprise is required to issue a warrant to purchase stock to the
outlier bank. The warrant has a “dilution equivalent to 25–50
basis points” fully diluted (meaning 0.25 percent to 0.5 percent
of ownership of the enterprise.)165 If the warrant has 50 basis
points, the bank has the right to purchase $250,000 worth of
shares of the company with a $50 million valuation. Further, the
warrant here constitutes only 1/40th of the dilution for 30
percent additional runway compared to the $10 million Series A
capital fund with 20 percent ownership!166 In other words, the
enterprise would be able to meet its milestones, survive, and
excel to Series B, without diluting its equity as it would have if
it sought the loan from a non-bank lender.167
As with any loan, the enterprise must pay the loan
principal and interest payments. Typically, the outlier bank
provides free interest payments the first year, and around a 5
percent interest rate for the subsequent two years of the threeyear term loan in IP Venture Banking.168 The interest rate is
substantially lower than what the startup can secure from
alternative sources.169 There are several reasons for the lower
their clients otherwise. See id. (analogizing this counterintuitive approach as testing an
umbrella when it is sunny outside).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.; see also Gordan, supra note 22 (explaining the general benefits of
venture debt to the entrepreneurs).
167 See Gordan, supra note 22 (“The incremental capital afforded by a venture
loan allows startups to achieve more progress ahead of the next valuation event, or to
increase the certainty of reaching such milestones, while minimizing the dilution that
would occur by securing additional capital at an earlier round.”).
168 Even in late stage growth company, for example, the loan from Square 1
Bank to Celator Pharmaceuticals, Inc. executed in June 2012 was $3 million at 5.5%
interest rate, with interest-only payments in the first six months. See CELATOR PHARM.,
INC & SQUARE 1 BANK, AMENDED AND RESTATED WARRANT TO PURCHASE STOCK 1 (2012),
https://www.lawinsider.com/contracts/456JKcpBP6hlSGBYkzRuou/celator-pharm
aceuticals/1327467/2012-11-13 [https://perma.cc/9UM4-7YJ7]; see also Celator Pharm.,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Apr. 1, 2013), https://last10k.com/sec-filings/cpxx
/0001193125-13-136909.htm [https://perma.cc/7TQE-A65L].
169 On the other hand, venture loans from non-bank sources have higher interest rates
in the 10%–15% range. See Gordan, supra note 22 (providing a chart of venture debt terms);
Andrew L. Wang, Alternative Lending: Nonbank Business Funding Options, NERDWALLET
(June 27, 2017), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/small-business/small-business-loansalternative-lending/[https://perma.cc/XE68-DMUK] (“Most alternative business lenders offer
loans with double-digit, even triple-digit, rates.”); Sara Ashley O’Brien, Non-Bank Loans: Quick,
Easy . . . and Addictive?, CNN BUS. (July 18, 2014), https://money.cnn.com/2014/07/17/smallb
usiness/alternative-financing/index.html [https://perma.cc/7TEF-667V] (stating that bank
financing is the cheapest but most small businesses not qualified for bank loans turn to
alternative lenders with higher interest rate fees and unfavorable terms).
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interest rate in a loan from an outlier bank. Unlike alternative
lenders who have no access to cheap money, outlier banks do.170
As commercial banks, outlier banks receive money from
depositors.171 These deposits are other people’s money, and banks
pay depositors low interest and charge borrowers high interest.172
With access to plenty of low cost money, outlier banks can lend to
startups at a lower cost.173 Of course, outlier banks still must be
careful in selecting only the VC-backed enterprises that are most
likely to reach new rounds of venture funding, ensuring that the
banks will receive payments on the principal, fees, and interest.174
Overall, in exchange for the warrant as part of the loan
cost, the outlier banks can give “more favorable credit terms” to
the startups.175 In other words, the startups get lower interest
rates and favorable terms on the loan to extend their runway to
meet milestones and the next round of VC funding.176
B.

Why Do Outlier Banks Demand Warrants?

Intellectual property is the most important asset that tech
companies in early stages own.177 Ownership of proprietary
knowledge, trade secrets, copyrights, and patents is what
distinguishes one tech company from another.178 The intellectual
170 See generally Stephen D. Simpson, The Banking System: Commercial Banking –
How Banks Make Money, DECLARA (Oct. 26, 2018), https://declara.com/content/L5yDKNKg
[https://perma.cc/5VXX-A768](explaining the banking business model).
171 See generally Bill Conerly, Why Are Banks Paying So Little Interest on Deposits?,
FORBES (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2017/10/17/why-are-bankspaying-so-little-interest-on-deposits/#3df1432756c3 [https://perma.cc/J7RG-TU9K] (noting that
banks are sitting on plenty of deposits, paying very little interest, and thus lend “the money out
in loans, and receiving more interest income than they pay out”).
172 See Simpson, supra note 170 (“[B]anks basically make money by lending
money at rates higher than the cost of the money they lend. More specifically, banks
collect interest on loans and interest payments from the debt securities they own, and
pay interest on deposits, CDs, and short-term borrowings.”).
173 See Levy, supra note 55.
174 See Signaling Model, supra note 15, at 224–29.
175 See Reckard, supra note 77.
176 See Levy, supra note 55 (“Banks like City National are looking to get a slice
of a market that has long been the purview of Silicon Valley Bank, or SVB, in Santa
Clara. The other aggressive players taking on SVB are Comerica, which has been active
in spurts, and smaller niche firms Square 1 Bank and Bridge Bank. The race for clientele
is pushing prices so low that early-stage Web companies with some momentum can
borrow a few million bucks at a rate that’s a little higher than what they’d pay on a home
mortgage.”); see also Coyle & Green, supra note 135.
177 See Richard Harroch & Neel Chatterjee, 10 Intellectual Property Strategies for
Technology Startups, FORBES (June 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/al
lbusiness/2017/06/06/10-intellectual-property-strategies-for-technology-startups/#7d8bb
a3aab1b [https://perma.cc/3DWU-GN7N] (explaining that “intellectual property is often the
most valuable asset of a technology startup”).
178 See id. (“[I]ntellectual property can be essential to obtaining venture capital
funding or preventing competitors from unfairly competing with you.”).
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property assets are so valuable that they are the key driver of the
enterprise.179 In other words, the value of the enterprise is
dependent on the intellectual property, and vice versa.180 The high
valuation the enterprise garners reflects in part how important
investors view the intellectual property assets as the key driver of
the enterprise.181 If the startup survives, thrives, and scales, it will
be likely to receive the next round of capital funding at a
tremendously increased valuation of the entire enterprise.182
Consequently, outlier banks make loans to startups for the upside:
obtaining some benefits from the enterprise’s high valuation at
subsequent rounds of capital funding.183 The outlier banks want
warrants as part of the loan’s cost to the startup.
A warrant is what an enterprise furnishes to the outlier
banks that confers to the banks the right, but not the obligation, to
purchase the startup’s shares at a certain price, and with a specific
expiration on a future date.184 The startup usually offers the

179 See generally David Pridham, Intellectual Property: The Secret Sauce of Great
Products, FORBES (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidpridham/2015/12/07/in
tellectual-property-the-secret-sauce-of-great-products/#12cebe413c1b [https://perma.cc/EFH22RCV] (stating that “IP serves as one of the key drivers of business success in today’s Knowledge
Economy”, “the secret sauce of corporate value creation”, and that corporate revenues are “often
heavily dependent upon intellectual property — margins and market share are buttressed by
brands, trademarks and patents, after all”).
180 Peculiarly, the value of intellectual property assets to the enterprise is hidden
from the public. See id. (“IP and other intangible assets, while compromising up to 80% of the
market value of public companies today, are rarely reflected on corporate balance sheets,
thanks to a 600-year-old accounting system designed for a bygone era in which tangible assets
like plant, equipment, and raw materials were the chief sources of wealth.”).
181 Indeed, investors targeting companies to acquire is for the purpose of obtaining
the target’s intellectual property. See LANNING G. BRYER & SCOTT J. LEBSON, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ASSETS IN MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS (2003), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/
www/sme/en/documents/pdf/mergers.pdf [https://perma.cc/77TN-FPGX] (concluding that
“[t]he driving force behind a majority of mergers” has been “the acquirer’s desire to obtain the
target’s intellectual property assets”).
182 See Series A, B, C Funding – The Ultimate Guide, FUNDZ, https://www.fundz.
net/what-is-series-a-funding-series-b-funding-and-more [https://perma.cc/4SLW-QPU9]
(stating that in 2019 the median Series A funding round had a valuation of $22 million,
Series B increased to $58 million and Series C jumped to $115 million). In each round of
funding, analysts conduct the valuation of the enterprise. Nathan Reiff, Series A, B, C
Funding: How It Works, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/
articles/personal-finance/102015/series-b-c-funding-what-it-all-means-and-how-itworks.asp [https://perma.cc/TZN7-PVDY].
183 See Signaling Model, supra note 15, at 224.
184 Kappel v. Advanced Equities, Inc., No. 08 C 1991, 2008 WL 4865662, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. June 18, 2008) (“[A warrant] confers the right to purchase shares of stock at a specific
price . . . . If the price conferred by the warrant is lower than the market price, the warrant has
value . . . . [T]he most a warrant holder can get if she trades in the warrant for a share of stock
and sells the stock immediately is the price of the stock less the warrant (strike) price set by the
warrant.”); Ken Little, What Are Stock Warrants? A Warrant Gives Its Holder the Right to Buy
Stock Shares at a Fixed Price, BALANCE (Nov. 28, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/what-arestock-warrants-3140517 [https://perma.cc/5Q98-GMGT] (“Warrants are good for a fixed period
of time, but they’re worthless once they expire.”).

2020]

LENDING INNOVATIONS

165

warrant at a very low price.185 When the startup survives, scales,
and advances to subsequent capital funding with the enterprise’s
new and high valuation, the price of the stock at this time is
substantially higher than the price conferred in the warrant. The
outlier bank can cash in on the warrant and reap the difference
between the current price of the stock and the warrant price.
Illustratively, five young tech companies, in six separate
transactions, as discussed below, have borrowed money from
different outlier banks. In each transaction, the borrower was
required to grant the banks warrants for the rights to purchase
stock at a fixed low price as part of the loan cost. The banks later
exercised their rights under the warrants when each of the
borrowers’ stock value increased.
Xoom Corporation is a digital consumer-to-consumer online
money transfers and payment services company founded in 2001
in San Francisco.186 As part of the cost to obtain an IP venture loan
from SVB, Xoom issued a warrant for 43,114 initial shares of
common stock at the warrant price of $0.05 per share on October
29, 2004, to the bank.187 The warrant also granted SVB the right to
purchase additional shares for subsequent loans as provided in the
agreement.188 The warrant allowed SVB to exercise its right any
time before the expiration date of October 29, 2011.189 When Xoom
entered into the loan agreement with the bank, the startup had
just received Series B capital funding on February 13, 2004, for
$5.6 million.190 Xoom excelled and advanced to subsequent rounds
of funding. By March 19, 2010, Xoom obtained Series F funding
and raised $33.2 million.191 Consequently, SVB greatly benefitted
from the warrant that it had demanded from Xoom back in 2004,
now that the value of the shares had spiked. Moreover, on April 30,
2012, Xoom was in need of a new loan for its continued growth, and
the company issued another warrant to SVB.192 Xoom conferred to

185 The shares can be as low as 5 cents per share. See XOOM CORP. & SILICON
VALLEY BANK, WARRANT TO PURCHASE STOCK 1 (2004), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/d
ata/1315657/000119312513010596/d364901dex44.htm [https://perma.cc/7TFH-HMWA].
186 Xoom Corp, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/pri
vate/snapshot.asp?privcapId=24115102 [https://perma.cc/ZG2D-8DYQ]; Colleen Taylor,
Xoom Closes Its First Day On The NASDAQ At $25.49 Per Share, Up 59 Percent From
IPO Price, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 15, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/02/15/xoom-ipo/
[https://perma.cc/H5CR-D5RV].
187 See XOOM CORP. & SILICON VALLEY BANK, supra note 185.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Xoom, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/xoom#secti
on-ipo-stock-performance [https://perma.cc/P9V4-DHXX].
191 Id.
192 XOOM CORP. & SILICON VALLEY BANK, WARRANT TO PURCHASE STOCK 1 (2012),
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the Bank the right to purchase 100,000 shares at $1.71 per share.
Ten months later, Xoom held an IPO at a price of $16.00 per
share.193 In sum, the valuation of the enterprise Xoom increased,
and SVB reaped a handsome return from having the warrant.194
Outlier banks can also obtain warrants for convertible
stock as part of the price for the loans to startups. An example
of this is Etsy, a peer-to-peer marketplace vis-à-vis a
smartphone app that enables the buying and selling handmade
and vintage items. Etsy was founded on June 18, 2005, and it
subsequently received Series A funding on November 1, 2006,
and Series C on July 1, 2007.195 While flush with new Series C
funding, Etsy signed a loan and security agreement with SVB on

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1315657/000119312513010596/d364901dex45.htm
[https://perma.cc/D236-JBZM]. The issue has the expiration date of April 30, 2022. Id. In the 10K filing in 2014, Xoom stated:
In October 2009, the Company entered into a loan and security agreement
(the ‘Loan Agreement’), with Silicon Valley Bank (‘SVB’), which was amended in
September 2012 to add a second lender and increase the available borrowing
amount. In September 2013, the Company entered into an Amended and
Restated Credit Agreement (the ‘Restated Loan Agreement’) with SVB and other
lenders. The Restated Loan Agreement added additional lenders, increased the
available borrowing amount to $150.0 million through September 2016 and
changed certain of the financial provisions. The Company is required to repay
the outstanding principal balance under the line of credit in full at least once
every eight business days. Under the Restated Loan Agreement, the Company
pays a fee of 0.50% per annum for the daily unused portions of the line of credit.
The interest rate at December 31, 2014 and December 31, 2013 was 4.25%. The
Company paid a one-time commitment fee of $430,000 and a one-time
arrangement fee of 0.30% of the amount available under the line of credit in 2013.
The Company also paid SVB an annual administration fee of $45,000 in 2013
and 2014. These expenses, except the annual administration fee which is
expensed over twelve months, are being amortized over the period of the
Restated Loan Agreement . . . . SVB issued a standby letter of credit for $15.0
million which satisfied an additional collateral requirement to maintain the
Company’s India operations and a $3.9 million letter of credit in January 2014
as a security deposit for the Company’s new office lease.
Xoom Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1315657/000155837015000240/xoom-20141231x10k.htm
[https://perma.cc/T5PN-BEY2].
193 See Xoom, supra note 190 (reporting that Xoom went public on February 15, 2013).
194 For other warrants that Silicon Valley Bank has received from its tech clients in
connection with loan agreement, see ITERUM THERAPEUTICS PUB. LTD. CO & SILICON VALLEY
BANK, WARRANT TO SUBSCRIBE FOR SHARES 1 (2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ed
gar/data/0001659323/000119312518152964/d522368dex1021.htm [https://perma.cc/9UCEVVDV] (providing to Silicon Valley Bank 156,250 shares at $1.20 per share in the warrant
agreement issued on April 27, 2018 with an expiration date on April 27, 2028); 3PARDATA,
INC. & SILICON VALLEY BANK, WARRANT TO PURCHASE STOCK 1, 10 (2005),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1408501/000119312507207554/dex1022.htm
[https://perma.cc/4CDF-M3T5] (providing to Silicon Valley Bank 53,187 or greater number of
shares at $0.94 per share issued on June 30, 2005 for ten years).
195 Etsy, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/etsy [https://
perma.cc/PXT4-7SX2].
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November 15, 2007.196 As part of the price of the loan, Etsy issued
a warrant of 16,854 initial shares of Series C convertible stock
to SVB.197 Etsy agreed to provide additional shares if the Bank
made a loan to Etsy for an equipment purchase in excess of
$500,000 in the aggregate.198 The warrant price per share was
$2.67 per share, and the duration of the warrant was 10 years
with the expiration date of November 14, 2017.199 In 2008, the
company received Series D funding of $27 million, and then
Series E of $20 million in 2010.200 That meant the bank loan
payments were paid off, and the Bank could continue to keep the
warrant for a later payout. Holding on to the warrant was
fruitful as Etsy had its IPO in 2015, and on November 14, 2017—
the expiration date of the warrant—the value was $16.25 per
share.201 Consequently, SVB could enjoy its investment by
cashing in on the warrant before or on the expiration date. As a
point of reference, if the bank had subsequently made additional
loans to Etsy and accepted new warrants, the price per share for
Etsy was around $40 per share in August 2018 should the bank
wish to cash in on the warrants then.202
The same startup can borrow also from different outlier
banks and pay different costs for the loans in warrant amount
and interest rate. Celator Pharmaceuticals, Inc. issued a
warrant to ComericA Bank on March 11, 2009, in connection
with an IP venture loan.203 The warrant was for the right to
purchase 233,333 shares of the Series C Preferred Stock at $0.60
per share.204 The warrant expired in March of 2016.205 Celator
went public in 2013 and was subsequently acquired by Jazz
Pharmaceuticals for $1.5 billion in May 2016.206 As the valuation

196 Sample Business Contracts: Warrant to Purchase Stock – Etsy Inc. and Silicon
Valley Bank, ONECLE, https://contracts.onecle.com/etsy/silicon-valley-bank-warrant-2007-1115.shtml [https://perma.cc/TB88-RFLH].
197 Id.
198 Id. The formula to determine the additional share is the “number of
additional shares of the Class as shall equal (a) $25,000, divided by (b) the Warrant Price
in effect on and as of the date of such Equipment Advance.” Id.
199 Id.
200 See Etsy, supra note 195.
201 Etsy,
Inc., INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/markets/stoc
ks/etsy/ [https://perma.cc/J8E6-DR7T] (providing Etsy’s daily price in the last five years).
202 Id.
203 CELATOR PHARM., INC. & COMERICA BANK, WARRANT TO PURCHASE STOCK 1
(2009), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1327467/000119312512517529/d411577dex43.
htm [https://perma.cc/DFZ9-DPPS].
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Amy Reeves, Jazz Pharma Paying 4 Times Peak Sales For Celator Leukemia Drug,
INV. BUS. DAILY (May 31, 2016, 4:36 PM), https://www.investors.com/news/technology/jazzpharma-paying-4-times-peak-sales-for-celator-leukemia-drug/ [https://perma.cc/Z93A-X655].
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of Celator increased at subsequent IPO or acquisition, ComericA
enjoyed the benefits by cashing in on the warrant.
Celator also issued a warrant to Square 1 Bank on June
15, 2012, for a loan of $3 million at an interest rate of 5.5 percent,
with payments for interest only payable for the first six
months.207 In connection with this loan, Celator provided to
Square 1 Bank the right to purchase 17,267 shares of common
stock at the price of $5.21 per share with the expiration date of
June 15, 2019.208 That meant Square 1 Bank could reap the
warrant benefits when Jazz Pharmaceuticals purchased Celator
in May of 2016 at $30.25 per share.209
Joining SVB, ComericA and Square 1 Bank, Bridge Bank
is another outlier bank active in providing loans to and receiving
warrants from startups. For example, Bridge Bank holds a
warrant to purchase stock issued by GigOptix, Inc. on April 7,
2010, in connection with the loan agreement entered between
the two parties.210 GigOptix was founded in 2001 for the design
and manufacture of “high speed integrated circuits that connect
the optical and electronic domains.”211 The company
subsequently received several venture rounds of funding.212 In
recent years, the company itself is expanding as it has recently
acquired Magnum Semiconductor Inc. for $55 million.213
In some cases the outlier bank can simply sit back and
watch as its warrant grows in value. For example, Square 1 Bank
agreed to extend a credit line of seven million dollars to Otonomy.214
As part of the loan price, Square 1 Bank received a warrant to
purchase stock signed by Otonomy, Inc. for Series B Preferred

207 See Celator Pharm., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Apr. 1, 2013), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1327467/000119312513136909/d513410d10k.htm
[https://perma.cc/3FEQ-KCP9]. For the Warrant to Purchase Stock Agreement between
Celator and Square 1 Bank, see CELATOR PHARM., INC & SQUARE 1 BANK, AMENDED AND
RESTATED WARRANT TO PURCHASE STOCK (2012), https://www.lawinsider.com/contracts/
456JKcpBP6hlSGBYkzRuou/celator-pharmaceuticals/1327467/2012-11-13
[https://perma.cc/9UM4-7YJ7].
208 Id.
209 Jazz Pharma to Buy Celator in $1.5 Billion Deal, REUTERS (May 31, 2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-celator-m-a-jazz-phrmt/jazz-pharma-to-buy-celatorin-1-5-billion-deal-idUSKCN0YM0QK [https://perma.cc/8RT6-P7RD].
210 See Gigoptix, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A) (June 10, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1432150/000119312510137248/d10ka.htm
[https://perma.cc/6T4U-ZUUN].
211 Gigoptix, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/gigoptix#
section-overview [https://perma.cc/D7H3-WWFR].
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 See OTONOMY, INC. & SQUARE 1 BANK, LOAN AND SECURITY AGREEMENT 1 (2013),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1493566/000119312514266440/d724113dex1010.htm
[https://perma.cc/D8GZ-465T].
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stock at $0.4032 per share.215 The number of shares, 520,000, is
based on the calculation of 3 percent of the principal amount of the
loans divided by the initial warrant price of $0.4032.216 The warrant
was entered on July 31, 2013, and has an expiration date of July
31, 2023.217 Otonomy is a biopharmaceutical company in the
development and commercialization of “treatments for diseases of
the inner and middle ear.”218 The company was founded in 2008
and went public on August 14, 2014. At the time of writing, its
share price was $6.30 per share.219 The Bank can either cash in the
warrant or keep it as a future investment.
In summary, the warrants are the windfall investment
on the intellectual property’s enterprise value when outlier
banks cash in at the enterprise’s subsequent acquisition event
or IPO. Illustratively, SVB is known for taking the warrants on
loans to startup companies with VC backing. Fitbit, the maker
of fitness-tracking wristbands, was one of those startup clients
that issued a warrant to the bank. The bank held on to the
warrant and cashed it in when Fitbit went public. The money
that SVB made on the warrant “exceeded losses” from loans
made to startups “over the last 10 years.”220
V.

SECURITY INTERESTS IN PATENTS AS THE LAST RESORT

There are risks in IP Venture Banking. Startups suffer from
high failure rates in trying to meet their milestones and are often
not able to obtain the next round of VC funding.221 Without the new
round of cash infusion through VC funding, there is no money to
215 Sample Business Contracts: Warrant to Purchase Stock – Otonomy Inc. and
Square 1 Bank, ONECLE, https://contracts.onecle.com/otonomy/square-one-warrant-201207-31.shtml [https://perma.cc/3QPU-K2H9].
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Otonomy, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/otonomy#sect
ion-ipo-stock-performance [https://perma.cc/TYS9-DFRX].
219 Id.
220 See Reckard, supra note 77 (reporting on warrants received by SVB and how
the warrants “yield big profits” to the Bank).
221 Startups are notoriously risky. For the fortunate few startups with VC-back
funding, they face their own challenge of receiving the next round. In fact, the hardest
challenge is obtaining Series B funding after receiving Series A. See Fred Destin, Series B Is
Usually the Hardest, MEDIUM (Oct. 22, 2015), https://medium.com/@fdestin/series-b-isusually-the-hardest-b40df7b9c166 [https://perma.cc/L9D8-FE2M] (dissecting what startups
face in order to get to Series B, “the unloved valley of slow progress that precedes
scaling . . . . the no-man’s land of the startup build phase”); see also Tomasz Tunguz, The
Challenge of Raising Series B, TOMTUNGUZ (May 14, 2017), http://tomtunguz.com/challengesof-the-series-b/ [https://perma.cc/HJG5-47FL] (“At the time of the B, a small number of
companies may have proven that thesis beyond doubt: either growing quickly enough to
command a huge price (huge and unquestionable success) or proving the initial hypothesis
isn’t viable (certain failure). But most companies will find themselves having proven only
certain parts of the go-to-market, but not all.”).
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pay back the loans to the outlier banks.222 Moreover, if the
enterprise is struggling financially, its intellectual property assets
are not worth much more than liquidation value.223 That means
outlier banks must plan for the downside: taking a security interest
in the intellectual property assets as collateral in the event the
enterprise heads to liquidation.224
Indeed, anticipating that not all deals will be successful, the
banks will insist on taking security interests in the intellectual
property, the only valuable asset owned by the startup.225 The
intellectual property assets, if the banks foreclose on them, are the
resource of last resort in the event of liquidation.226 Outlier banks
often combine the loan and security interest in intellectual
property collateral together in the same document. For example,
Bazaarvoice was founded in 2005; the company and ComericA
Bank entered a Loan and Security Interest Agreement in 2007
wherein the company granted the bank a security interest in the
222 The survival rate is grim. For example, out of 100 seed companies, 32 will
advance to Series A, then 17 to Series B, 7 to Series C, 2 to Series C and 1 to Series E. See
Jason D. Rowley, The Startup Funding Graduation Rate Is Surprisingly Low,
MATTERMARK (Sept. 28, 2016), https://mattermark.com/startup-graduation-rate-surprisin
gly-low/ [https://perma.cc/3W6J-RN9K] (providing graphs and charts to illustrate the
matriculation rate of startups from round to round). The challenge to startups is endless:
notably, what “got you to raise that Series B will probably not work to get you to raise the
Series C.” Matthew Kropp, You Thought Raising Series A Was Hard? Here Comes Series
B!, VATOR (June 5, 2018), http://vator.tv/news/2018-06-05-you-thought-raising-series-awas-hard-here-comes-series-b [https://perma.cc/NQR5-XRHP].
223 In fact, lenders, when participating in asset-based lending with intellectual
property assets as collateral, typically rely on experts to ascertain the liquidation value of the
intellectual property to minimize the risks in contemplating loans to established companies
with large intellectual property portfolios. See Bienias & Cornelius, supra note 33.
224 Loan and Security Agreement – Silicon Valley Bank and Accrue Software Inc.,
FINDLAW, https://corporate.findlaw.com/contracts/finance/loan-and-security-agreement-siliconvalley-bank-and-accrue.html [https://perma.cc/4EJW-PQBF]. The startup went IPO on July 30,
1999. See Acru, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/ipo/accrue-software-ipo—2c73
d61c#section-details [https://perma.cc/H876-ABM2]. The company, however, went out of
business on May 4, 2006. See Accrue Software Inc., BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.
com/profile/company/ACRUQ:US [https://perma.cc/82BE-7K27]. If the banks don’t take security
interests in the intellectual property, they impose negative covenants prohibiting borrowers
from using the intellectual property as collateral in lending transactions with other entities. See
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. Rev. 1887, 1923 (1994) (noting
that “in some circumstances negative covenants combined with credit reporting can make it
impossible for debtors to transfer property that is not collateral”).
225 Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the banks would then
perfect their security interest in the collateral by filing the financing statements with
the appropriate filing authority. See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Financing
Innovation: Legal Development of Intellectual Property as Security in Financing, 18452014, 48 IND. L. REV. 509, 510 (2015) (detailing the development of secured financing
with intellectual property collateral).
226 Through perfection of security interest in the intellectual property collateral,
the banks, as secured creditors, can gain priority over other creditors, including
bankruptcy trustees. See generally Moldo v. Matsco, Inc. (In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc.),
239 B.R. 917, 923–24 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (ruling that Matsco and Financial perfected
their security interest in the patent collateral and the bankruptcy trustee could not avoid
the perfected security interest).
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intellectual property collateral.227 Likewise, SVB has long insisted
on taking a security interest in startups’ intellectual property
assets as collateral. For instance, one of SVB’s startup clients was
Accrue Software, Inc., which was founded in 1996.228 It obtained a
loan from SVB in 1997 and granted the bank a security interest in
the startup’s intellectual property, as seen in the Loan and Security
Agreement executed by the parties.229
Our empirical research reveals that outlier banks have
recorded their security interests in patents and patent
applications as collateral. The banks typically recorded their
security interests with the USPTO.
Most tellingly, among all banks that have recorded their
security interests in patent collaterals with the USPTO, more
than 90 percent of the filings are done by banks with traditional
lending models that lend to established companies with large
patent portfolios. Consequently, the average number of patents
per deal done by these banks is 38.5. On the other hand, outlier
banks embrace the IP Venture Banking model by lending to
startups that are not established companies and have procured
very few patents. The average the number of patents per deal
for outlier banks is 9.4. Table 3 shows the average numbers of
patents per deal for outlier banks and other top banks.230
Group
Top 14 Banks
Outlier Banks

Average
in Table 2
in Table 2

Patents Per Deal
38.5
9.4

In taking a security interest in patents as a last resort, in
the event that the startup is in liquidation, outlier banks must
anticipate potential buyers of the intellectual property assets at the
outset, when the banks are contemplating whether to make the
loan. Otherwise, when the startup is in liquidation, and the banks
are trying to understand the market and attempting to identify a
buyer for the foreclosed intellectual property, it is often too late to
recoup the maximum value for the collateral and too uncertain to
recover the loan amount. Therefore, the networks of experts,
investors, entrepreneurs, and executives that banks have
See COMERICA BANK & BAZAARVOICE, INC., supra note 131, at 1–6.
See Accrue Software Inc., supra note 224.
229 See Loan and Security Agreement – Silicon Valley Bank and Accrue Software Inc.,
supra note 224. If outlier banks don’t take the security interest in the intellectual property
collateral, the outlier banks prohibit the borrowers from encumbering the intellectual property
without consent. See SILICON VALLEY BANK & INSTRUCTURE, INC., AMENDED AND RESTATED
LOAN AND SECURITY AGREEMENT (2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1355754/00
0119312515341090/d932934dex1012.htm [https://perma.cc/ZAY2-PKNA] (Exhibit A negative
pledge on security interest of intellectual property).
230 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
227
228
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cultivated through their strong and unique relationships with VCs
become highly relevant in shaping the outlier banks’
understanding of the startup client’s business and identifying who
may be the potential buyers of the distressed intellectual property
assets. The intellectual property collateral would be of little value
if there is no buyer when the outlier banks foreclose on the
property. In other words, the outlier banks must have their own
exit strategy should the client be in financial trouble, and the
intellectual property collateral is in liquidation.
As seen, SVB loaned to Ozro, Inc., a startup, and received
a security interest in Ozro’s patents for which the bank promptly
filed its senior security interest on April 2, 2001.231 Ozro also
granted a security interest in the same patents to Cross Atlantic
Capital Partners, Inc. (XACP) on the following day, April 3,
2001.232 A few months later, the startup did not perform well,
and the bank quickly exited the transaction and assigned its
security interest in Ozro’s patents to the junior secured party,
XACP.233 As anticipated, Ozro then “defaulted on its loan
obligations” and XACP, which was now the assignee of the senior
security interest and the holder of the junior security interest in
the patents collateral, foreclosed on the patents collateral.234
XACP then became the purchaser of the foreclosed patents at
the foreclosure sale, and immediately assigned its rights in the
patents to Sky Technologies.235
This example shows several things: first, SVB was closely
monitoring its client’s business. The bank knew when it needed
to exit—before the client’s business problems became too dire.
Second, because SVB insisted on a seniority position in its
security interest of the patents, it had the upper hand. XACP
was in the circles of networks that the bank had cultivated. With
that relationship, the bank could approach XACP to acquire the
bank’s senior security interest in the patent collateral. That was
exactly what the bank did: it assigned its rights to XACP.
Finally, SVB exited first, leaving XACP to conduct the actual
foreclosure, sale, and assigning of the patents to the purchaser,
Sky Technologies.236
See Sky Techs. LLC v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1377.
233 Id. XACP is a junior secured party, as the security agreement executed and
the security interest was filed the day after the bank’s filing. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a) (AM.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (priorities among conflicting security interests in
the same collateral ranked according to priority in time of filing or perfection).
234 Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1377.
235 Id. at 1378.
236 Id. at 1377–78 (“On February 18, 2003, XACP issued a foreclosure notice . . . to all
of Ozro’s creditors, inventors, and counsel . . . . On July 14, 2003, XACP foreclosed on its security
231
232
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Moreover, if the outlier banks do not take a security interest
in the startup’s intellectual property, the banks would insist on a
negative pledge that the borrower agrees “not to encumber” any of
its intellectual property without the consent of the banks. For
example, in the Loan and Security Agreement between SVB and
BigBand Networks, Inc., the negative pledge prohibiting security
interests in intellectual property is reaffirmed in Exhibit A.237 The
banks, instead, take a security interest in the borrower’s accounts
receivable, which typically are the income generated from the
borrower’s intellectual property-based products.
In summary, outlier banks accept security interests in
startups’ intellectual property assets as collateral as a last resort
in the event the enterprise is in liquidation. The value of the
intellectual property, therefore, is calculated at forced
liquidation.238 That means that, from the perspective of outlier
banks, valuation of intellectual property assets at going concern
value is not relevant and downright too risky for the banks to issue
the loan, as discussed next.
VI.

THE IRRELEVANT VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ASSETS

Broadly speaking, there are three different methods of
valuing intellectual property assets of a business:239 market-based,

interests at public auction. The security interest formerly held by SVB and subsequently
assigned to XACP was sold first, and then XACP foreclosed on its own security interest. XACP
was the only bidder for both sales and purchased all of the assets . . . . XACP assigned all of its
‘right[s], title, and interest in’ the patents . . . to Sky.” (alteration in original)).
237 SILICON VALLEY BANK & BIGBAND NETWORKS, INC., LOAN AND SECURITY
AGREEMENT 1 (2006), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1381325/00011931250625
9296/dex1022.htm [https://perma.cc/28G8-UW5F] (“Pursuant to the terms of a certain
negative pledge arrangement with Bank, each Borrower has agreed not to encumber any of
its copyright rights, copyright applications, copyright registrations and like protections in
each work of authorship and derivative work, whether published or unpublished, any patents,
patent applications and like protections, including improvements, divisions, continuations,
renewals, reissues, extensions, and continuations-in-part of the same, trademarks, service
marks and, to the extent permitted under applicable law, any applications therefor, whether
registered or not, and the goodwill of the business of such Borrower connected with and
symbolized thereby, know-how, operating manuals, trade secret rights, rights to unpatented
inventions, and any claims for damage by way of any past, present, or future infringement of
any of the foregoing, without Bank’s prior written consent.”); see also SILICON VALLEY BANK
& INSTRUCTURE, INC., supra note 229.
238 At the end, under the IP Venture Banking model, in the aggregate, even a
fractional share, typically less than 0.5%, in the enterprise value through equity
warrants, is more valuable to the outlier bank than the senior priority of the depressed
patents in liquidation.
239 See Cement-Lock v. Gas Tech. Inst., 618 F. Supp.2d 856, 864 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(recognizing the “[t]hree methods for valuing intellectual property . . . accepted by experts:
the income approach, the cost approach, and the market approach”).
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cost, and income approaches.240 As explained below, however, none
of these valuation methods for intellectual property is relevant for
IP Venture Banking. Moreover, contrary to what others have
espoused about the essential role of valuation of the intellectual
property assets for financing purposes, outlier banks do not rely on
valuation of the intellectual property owned by startups in their
lending determination.241
The market-based approach has other names: “the
industry standards method” and the “comparable technology
method.”242 As its names suggest, the approach requires that
there are comparable assets and transactions for sellers and
buyers to determine the likely price a buyer would pay for the
intellectual property assets being valued.243 The question the
valuator would seek to answer is: “What would be the value of
the asset on the open market based on information from similar
market transactions?”244 Thus, the market approach is only
relevant if there exists information for specific transaction
involving specific property.245 In a startup situation, there simply
240 Id.; see also Adam Andrzejewski, Patent Auctions: The New IntellectualProperty Marketplace, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 831, 833–35 (2010) (describing the three
methods of valuation for intellectual property). Some scholars would expand the three
methods to establish seven or eight methods of valuation for intellectual property assets.
See generally Ted Hagelin, Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets: An Overview, 52
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1133 (2002) (discussing the three methods of valuation, seven methods
for intellectual property valuation, and proposing another method for measuring
intellectual property asset called “Competitive Advantage Valuation”).
241 See Shadab, supra note 32, at 1136 (predicting that “[b]etter IP valuation
methods, the growth of nonbank lenders that specialize in lending against IP (and other
nontraditional collateral), and the market’s growing comfort with using IP to secure
loans all indicate that there exist overlooked opportunities for startups that own IP”).
Moreover, investors in startups conduct valuation of the pre-revenue enterprise, not just
the intellectual property that the enterprise may or may not own. See Efrat Kasznik,
Intellectual Property Value in Startup Investments: A View from Silicon Valley, IPEG,
https://www.ipeg.com/intellectual-property-value-in-startup-investments-a-view-fromsilicon-valley/ [https://perma.cc/CV7Y-DNBM]. See generally Leo Polovets, How Do
Investors Value Pre-Revenue Companies?, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2014), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/quora/2014/01/24/how-do-investors-value-pre-revenue-companies
/#4a8c21486027 [https://perma.cc/NW4K-VQU4] (describing the method of valuating a
hypothetical pre-revenue startup).
242 See Hagelin, supra note at 240, 1134–35 (discussing the market approach,
and the pros and cons of the approach); see also Ted Hagelin, A New Method to Value
Intellectual Property, 30 AIPLA Q. J. 353, 362 (2002). With respect to patents, companies
like Microsoft and others evaluate “a patent’s value in the context of their other strategic
objectives” or “[v]aluation in the context of a portfolio strategy.” Anne Kelley, Practicing
in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 127 (2011).
243 See Krista F. Holt et al., What’s It Worth?: Principles of Patent Valuation, AM. B.
ASS’N (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/lan
dslide/2015-16/september-october/what-s-it-worth-principles-patent-valuation/ [https://perma.c
c/667B-D5F6] (identifying “two widely used databases” provided by RoyaltyStat and
RoyaltySource for searches of comparable patent licenses for valuation purposes under the
market approach).
244 Id.
245 Id.
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exist no comparables for a market-based approach. Startups are
in the innovation space; they are not in the legacy, established
sectors. They do not deal in real estate, vessels, aircraft, or autos
that can be easily compared in the marketplace.
Appraisers often prefer the income approach—also
referred to as the discounted cash flow method—because it is
more accurate than the other methods in approximating the
value of an intellectual property and capturing the “going
concern value” of the intellectual property.246 As the name of the
valuation method denotes, the intellectual property must have
been generating regular income in order for the appraisers to
credibly project future income with some adjustment or discount
made for perceived risks.247 If the company has no income or cash
flow coming from its intellectual property assets, for instance,
the licensing of the intellectual property at a certain royalty rate
or the sales record of products based on the intellectual property
assets, then the income approach is either inapplicable or “the
property’s value is speculative.”248 Consequently, the income
approach is not suitable for valuing a startup’s intellectual
property, as startups have no income and are still working on
perfecting their technology. Moreover, startups exist to disrupt
and need lots of cash to burn on their runway in order to meet
targets and to scale. The income, if any, that they generate does
not reflect the historic, regular, reliable cash flow that an
established company typically generates for appraisers to
predict the value of the intellectual property asset. In addition,
when a company is not an established business with historic
cash flow for traditional asset-based financing, experts in
valuing intellectual property for traditional, asset-based lending

246 See Robert Brady et al., Determining and Preserving the Assets of Dot-Coms,
28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 185, 221–22 (2003) (stating that appraisers typically use the income
approach in valuing intellectual property). Another name for the income method is the
capitalization method. See generally Provitola v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M (CCH) 939 (1990)
(stating that the appraiser for the IRS had considered “three potential methods of
valuing the LFMS software, i.e., replacement cost, market or comparable sales, and
capitalization or income”).
247 See Brady et al., supra note 246 (describing the income method for valuing
intellectual property assets).
248 Provitola, 60 T.C.M (CCH) at 939 (“The inability to determine value under
the income or capitalization method, when it is otherwise applicable, does not necessarily
mean that use of such valuation method is inappropriate; rather, it simply indicates that
the property’s value is speculative.”). In Provitola, the Tax Court accepted the fair
market value of the donated software was zero under the income method because there
is no market for the software. Id. (agreeing with the IRS expert that the taxpayer’s
software donations to Stetson University “had no value”).
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purposes would estimate the value of the intellectual property
for liquidation, not for “going concern value.”249
Finally, the cost approach is also not suitable because,
under this approach, the intellectual property is assumed to be
replaceable. It is not possible to ascertain the cost to replace the
intellectual property assets created by the startups. All the
investment contributed by the founder, founder’s friends and
family members, by angel investors, and by VC, in addition to
the countless hours and efforts of all who work at the startup, do
not accurately reflect the cost of replacing the intellectual
property assets.250 Also, if the intellectual property has incomegenerating potential, the cost method does not capture that
value.251 The method is, therefore, typically not used for financial
transactions, but rather for accounting and bookkeeping.252
In addition, valuation of intellectual property assets is
generally expensive and too costly for startups in particular, as
it requires experts to conduct the valuation. Startups simply do
not have financial resources to pay for such experts, and the
valuation cost would cause the overall loan price to increase to a
degree that enterprises would prefer to avoid.253
As the approaches are costly, unsuitable, and unreliable,
outlier banks neither rely on nor insist that startups obtain
valuation of intellectual property assets in IP Venture Banking.
Moreover, by leveraging their uniquely strong relationship with
VCs, outlier banks instead rely on the VC clients for their due
diligence and valuation of the entire enterprise, including the
enterprise’s intellectual property. For example, VCs are known
for conducting intensive patent analysis, and they do not invest
in startups with questionable patents.254 By relying on the VCs’
249 See Bienias & Cornelius, supra note 33 (“Between the lack of transparency
under Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) and the need to identify liquidation value (as opposed to ‘going
concern’ value), an independent valuation of the IP is almost always necessary in order
to establish the value of these assets for lending purposes.”).
250 See Andrzejewski, supra note 240, at 833 (noting that under the cost
approach, “the amount of cost is too high or too low,” so the value of the intellectual
property is “either overestimated or underestimated”).
251 See Bienias & Cornelius, supra note 33 (discussing valuation problems for
startups in obtaining financing).
252 See Andrzejewski, supra note 240, at 833.
253 Alternative lenders are more likely to insist on valuation of intellectual
property to ascertain the liquidation value before they make their lending decisions to
startups. See Bienias & Cornelius, supra note 33. These lenders would pass the cost to
the startup borrowers. Consequently, the startup borrowers pay higher interest rates,
higher fees, and valuation cost, if they cannot get a loan from outlier banks and have no
choice but to go to alternative lenders. Id.
254 See Brief of Amici Curiae Venture Capital Firms Aberdare Ventures et al. in
Support of Respondents, supra note 111, at 13–14 (“Because of the expense involved, venture
capital firms typically forego an analysis of a target company’s patents until they are certain
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analysis of the startup patents, outlier banks can make their
lending decision without having to incur a costly, unsuitable,
and unreliable valuation of the intellectual property.255 Overall,
outlier banks keep the pricing for IP venture loans low, enabling
VC-backed startups to gain extra months of cash to lengthen
their runway to meet their targets and bring themselves one
step closer to their disruptive innovation.256
CONCLUSION
Banks have a crucial role in facilitating innovation by
disrupting their own lending business model. There are many
startups hungry for bank loans while banks have been
systematically avoiding them. Outlier banks’ use of IP Venture
Banking is, hopefully, a new beginning for both banks and
startups, across the nation and around the world, on the path of
borrowing and lending for innovations.257

that the company presents an otherwise viable investment opportunity. Patent analysis,
therefore, literally becomes the make-or-break stage in deciding whether to invest. Unless
venture capitalists can determine with a reasonable degree of certainty that a patent will be
granted by the PTO, will reasonably protect the company’s inventions, and will have a high
probability of surviving subsequent challenge, e.g., in litigation, the investment simply will not
be made.”); see also JOAN FARRE-MENSA ET AL., DO PATENTS FACILITATE ENTREPRENEURS’
ACCESS TO VENTURE CAPITAL? (2016), https://www.lebow.drexel.edu/sites/default/files/event
/1478115147-joan-farre-mensa-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6ZF-6C2G] (“[T]he approval of a
startup’s first patent application increases its likelihood of raising venture capital (VC) funding
in the following three years by 3.5 percentage points—a 59% increase relative to the
unconditional probability of raising VC funding.”).
255 See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software
Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 984–85 (2005) (contextualizing VCs approach to
analyzing and understanding the patents or patent applications of a portfolio company
in ascertaining information relating to both technical scope and market power
potentially stemming from the technology).
256 Some valuation companies have advocated for a different method of valuing the
intellectual property assets owned by early stage startups. See Scott Weingust & Mac Hibler,
Selecting Discount Rates for Valuing Early-Stage Intellectual Property, STOUT (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.stout.com/insights/article/selecting-discount-rates-valuing-early-stage-intellectualproperty [https://perma.cc/BV8Z-D3QP]; Samir Kaji, Venture Debt 101 – Banks vs. Venture Debt
Firms, PEVCBANKER (May 19, 2013), http://pevcbanker.com/venture-debt-101-banks-vsventure-debt-firms/ [https://perma.cc/Z5PK-AXPL] (“Banks are ALWAYS going to be the
cheapest form of financing.” (emphasis in original)). Venture lenders typically charge higher
interest rate than banks who are in the tech lending space. Id. (providing a comparison chart of
banks versus venture debt firms).
257 Some outlier banks are going a step further by making equity investment in
the startups. See Private Equity & Venture Capital, supra note 156; Thomas Hellman et
al., Building Relationships Early: Banks in Venture Capital, 21 R. FIN. STUD. 513, 518–
19 (2008).

